DEUTSCHE BANK SUBSIDIARY PLEADS GUILTY FOR ROLE IN LIBOR MANIPULATION CASE

FROM:  U.S. JUSTICE DEPARTMENT

Thursday, April 23, 2015

Deutsche Bank's London Subsidiary Agrees to Plead Guilty in Connection with Long-Running Manipulation of LIBOR

DB Group Services (UK) Limited, a wholly owned subsidiary of Deutsche Bank AG (Deutsche Bank), has agreed to plead guilty to wire fraud for its role in manipulating the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR), a leading benchmark interest rate used in financial products and transactions around the world.  In addition, Deutsche Bank entered into a deferred prosecution agreement to resolve wire fraud and antitrust charges in connection with its role in both manipulating U.S. Dollar LIBOR and engaging in a price-fixing conspiracy to rig Yen LIBOR.  Together, Deutsche Bank and its subsidiary will pay $775 million in criminal penalties to the Justice Department.

Assistant Attorney General Leslie R. Caldwell of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division, Assistant Attorney General Bill Baer of the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division and Assistant Director in Charge Andrew G. McCabe of the FBI’s Washington Field Office made the announcement.

DB Group Services (UK) Limited has agreed to plead guilty to one count of wire fraud, and to pay a $150 million fine, for engaging in a scheme to defraud counterparties to interest rate derivatives trades by secretly manipulating U.S. Dollar LIBOR contributions.

In addition, Deutsche Bank entered into a deferred prosecution agreement today and admitted its role in manipulating LIBOR and participating in a price-fixing conspiracy in violation of the Sherman Act by rigging Yen LIBOR contributions with other banks.  The agreement requires the bank to continue cooperating with the Justice Department in its ongoing investigation, to pay a $625 million penalty beyond the fine imposed upon DB Group Services (UK) Limited and to retain a corporate monitor for the three-year term of the agreement.

Together with approximately $1.744 billion in regulatory penalties and disgorgement—$800 million as a result of a Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) action, $600 million as a result of a New York Department of Financial Services (DFS) action, and $344 million as a result of a U.K. Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) action—the Justice Department’s criminal penalties bring the total amount of penalties to approximately $2.519 billion.

“For years, employees at Deutsche Bank illegally manipulated interest rates around the globe – including LIBORs for U.S. Dollar, Yen, Swiss Franc and Pound Sterling, as well as EURIBOR – in the hopes of fraudulently moving the market to generate profits for their traders at the expense of the bank’s counterparties,” said Assistant Attorney General Caldwell.  “Deutsche Bank is the sixth major financial institution that has admitted its misconduct in this wide-ranging criminal investigation, and today’s criminal resolution represents the largest penalty to date in the LIBOR investigation.”

“Deutsche Bank secretly conspired with its competitors to rig the benchmark interest rates at the heart of the global financial system,” said Assistant Attorney General Baer.  “Deutsche Bank’s misconduct not only harmed its unsuspecting counterparties, it undermined the integrity and the competitiveness of financial markets everywhere.”

“Deutsche Bank admitted to manipulating benchmark interest rates in currencies around the globe in order to benefit trading positions,” said Assistant Director in Charge McCabe.  “This wide reaching investigation represents yet another step in the FBI’s ongoing effort to find and stop those who deliberately participate in complex financial crimes to further their own bottom line.”

Deutsche Bank was a member of the panel of banks whose submissions were used to calculate the LIBORs for a number of currencies, including U.S. Dollar, Yen, Pound Sterling and Swiss Franc LIBOR, as well as EURIBOR (the Euro Interbank Offered Rate).

According to the agreements, from at least 2003 through early 2011, numerous Deutsche Bank derivatives traders—whose compensation was directly connected to their success in trading financial products tied to LIBOR—engaged in efforts to move these benchmark rates in a direction favorable to their trading positions.  Specifically, the derivatives traders requested that LIBOR submitters at Deutsche Bank and other banks submit contributions favorable to trading positions, rather than rates that complied with the definition of LIBOR.  Through these schemes, Deutsche Bank defrauded counterparties who were unaware of the manipulation.  Deutsche Bank admitted that the conduct affected the resulting LIBOR fix on various occasions.

Deutsche Bank further admitted that its employees engaged in this misconduct through face-to-face requests, electronic communications, which included both emails and electronic chats, and telephone calls.  For example, in an electronic chat on March 22, 2005, a Deutsche Bank U.S. Dollar LIBOR submitter explained how he would manipulate the rate for a trader in New York, stating, “if you need something in particular in the libors i.e. you have an interest in a high or a low fix let me know and there’s a high chance i’ll be able to go in a different level.  Just give me a shout the day before or send an email from your blackberry first thing.”

In another example described in the statement of facts, on May 17, 2006, the supervisor of LIBOR submissions in London received a request from a trader in New York asking, “If you can help we can use a high 3m fix tom.”  The supervisor replied to the trader and a U.S. Dollar LIBOR submitter, “I’m off but [submitter] is your libor man [] [submitter] could you take a look at 3s libor in the morning for [trader].”  The submitter agreed to accommodate the request, replying, “Will do chaps.”  The following morning, after he submitted the bank’s contribution, the submitter wrote to the trader, “I went in at 19+ for the 3m libor, as you’ll see it almost manage to reach 19.”

In an example from March 2007, a trader thanked one of Deutsche Bank’s EURIBOR submitters for his help in successfully manipulating EURIBOR, saying in an electronic chat: “Great job on this [Submitter], we can do more of this stuff,” to which the submitter replied, “WE CAN MY FRIEND. WE CAN….”  Later that day, the submitter bragged about Deutsche Bank’s manipulation by offices in Frankfurt and London in an email to the head of Deutsche Bank’s Global Finance Unit: “HAVE U SEEN THE 3MK FIXING TODAY? THAT WAS AN EXCELLENT CONCERTED ACTION FFT/LDN. CHEERS.”

Deutsche Bank also admitted to working with other banks to manipulate LIBOR contributions.  For instance, in a May 2009 electronic chat exchange, a UBS trader asked a Deutsche Bank trader, “cld you do me a favour would you mind moving you 6m libor up a bit today, i have a gigantic fix. . .”  The Deutsche Bank trader agreed.  The next day, the Deutsche Bank trader confirmed that the Yen LIBOR submission had been beneficial to the UBS trader, asking “u happy with me yesterday?”  The UBS trader acknowledged, “thx.”

By entering into a deferred prosecution agreement with Deutsche Bank, the Justice Department took several factors into consideration, including that Deutsche Bank’s cooperation with the government’s investigation was often helpful but also fell short in some important respects.  The department also considered the extensive remedial measures undertaken by Deutsche Bank’s management and its enhanced compliance program.  Deutsche Bank has agreed to continue cooperating with the government’s investigation, and the agreement does not prevent the Justice Department from prosecuting culpable individuals for related misconduct.  The documents will be filed in federal court in the District of Connecticut.

The Justice Department has previously announced resolutions with five other banks for their roles in manipulation of benchmark interest rates, including Barclays Bank PLC, UBS AG, The Royal Bank of Scotland plc, Coöperatieve Centrale Raiffeisen-Boerenleenbank B.A. (Rabobank) and Lloyds Banking Group plc.  The department has also charged 12 individuals as a result of this investigation, and three of those individuals have pleaded guilty.  The pending charges are merely accusations, and the defendants are considered innocent unless and until proven guilty.

This ongoing investigation is being conducted by special agents, forensic accountants and intelligence analysts of the FBI’s Washington Field Office.  The prosecution of Deutsche Bank is being handled by Assistant Chief Jennifer L. Saulino and Trial Attorney Alison L. Anderson of the Criminal Division’s Fraud Section and Trial Attorney Richard A. Powers of the Antitrust Division’s New York Field Office.  Deputy Chief Benjamin D. Singer and Assistant Chief Sandra Moser of the Criminal Division’s Fraud Section, Trial Attorney Daniel Tracer of the Antitrust Division’s New York Office, Assistant U.S. Attorneys Liam Brennan and Christopher Mattei of the District of Connecticut and the Criminal Division’s Office of International Affairs have also provided valuable assistance in this matter.

The investigation leading to these cases has required, and has greatly benefited from, a diligent and wide-ranging cooperative effort among various enforcement agencies both in the United States and abroad.  The Justice Department acknowledges and expresses its deep appreciation for this assistance.  In particular, the CFTC’s Division of Enforcement referred this matter to the department and, along with the FCA, has played a major role in the investigation.  The Securities and Exchange Commission has also played a significant role in the LIBOR series of investigations.  Various agencies and enforcement authorities in the United States and from other nations, including the United Kingdom’s Serious Fraud Office, BaFIN and the European Central Bank, are also participating in different aspects of the broader investigation relating to LIBOR and other benchmark rates, and the department is grateful for their cooperation and assistance.

This prosecution is part of efforts underway by President Barack Obama’s Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force.  President Obama established the interagency Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force to wage an aggressive, coordinated and proactive effort to investigate and prosecute financial crimes.  The task force includes representatives from a broad range of federal agencies, regulatory authorities, inspectors general and state and local law enforcement who, working together, bring to bear a powerful array of criminal and civil enforcement resources.  The task force is working to improve efforts across the federal executive branch, and with state and local partners, to investigate and prosecute significant financial crimes, ensure just and effective punishment for those who perpetrate financial crimes, combat discrimination in the lending and financial markets and recover proceeds for victims of financial crimes.

RBS SECURITIES JAPAN LIMITED PLEADS GUILTY IN LIBOR INTEREST RATE MANIPULATION CASE

FROM: U.S. JUSTICE DEPARTMENT
Wednesday, February 6, 2013
RBS Securities Japan Limited Agrees to Plead Guilty in Connection with Long-Running Manipulation of Libor Benchmark Interest Rates

Second Financial Institution to Plead Guilty to Libor Fraud and Pay Substantial Criminal Penalties; RBS Parent Company Also Admits Fault in Deferred Prosecution Agreement

RBS Securities Japan Limited, a wholly owned subsidiary of The Royal Bank of Scotland plc (RBS), has agreed to plead guilty to felony wire fraud and admit its role in manipulating the Japanese Yen London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR), a leading benchmark used in financial products and transactions around the world, Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Scott D. Hammond of the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division and Special Agent in Charge Timothy A. Gallagher of the FBI’s Washington Field Office Criminal Division announced today.

A criminal information, being filed in U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut, charges RBS Securities Japan with one count of wire fraud for engaging in a scheme to defraud counterparties to interest rate derivatives trades by secretly manipulating Yen LIBOR benchmark interest rates. RBS Securities Japan has signed a plea agreement with the government admitting its criminal conduct, and has agreed to pay a $50 million fine.

In addition, the government is filing a criminal information in the District of Connecticut which charges parent company RBS as part of a deferred prosecution agreement (DPA). The information charges RBS with wire fraud for its role in manipulating LIBOR benchmark interest rates, and with participation in a price-fixing conspiracy in violation of the Sherman Act by rigging the Yen LIBOR benchmark interest rate with other banks. The DPA requires the bank to admit and accept responsibility for its misconduct as described in an extensive statement of facts, to continue cooperating with the Justice Department in its ongoing investigation and to pay a $100 million penalty beyond the fine imposed upon RBS Securities Japan.

Together with approximately $462 million in regulatory penalties and disgorgement – $325 million as a result of a Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) action and approximately $137 million as a result of a U.K. Financial Services Authority (FSA) action – the Justice Department’s criminal penalties bring the total amount of the resolution with RBS and RBS Securities Japan to approximately $612 million.

"As we have done with Barclays and UBS, we are today holding RBS accountable for a stunning abuse of trust," said Assistant Attorney General Breuer. "The bank has admitted to manipulating one of the cornerstone benchmark interest rates in our global financial system, and its Japanese subsidiary has agreed to plead guilty to felony wire fraud. The department’s ongoing investigation has now yielded two guilty pleas by significant financial institutions. These are extraordinary results, and our investigation is far from finished. Our message is clear: no financial institution is above the law."

"RBS secretly rigged the benchmark interest rates upon which many transactions and consumer financial products are based," said Deputy Assistant Attorney General Hammond. "RBS’ conduct not only harmed its unsuspecting counterparties, it undermined the integrity and the competitiveness of financial markets everywhere."

"The manipulation of LIBOR by RBS and its subsidiary directly affected the rates referenced by financial products held by and on behalf of American companies and investors. The FBI works to uncover wrongdoing such as this in order to protect American consumers and the integrity of financial markets," said Special Agent in Charge Gallagher. "Today’s announcement is the result of the hard work of the FBI special agents, financial analysts, and forensic accountants as well as the prosecutors who dedicated significant time and resources to investigating this case."

According to court documents, LIBOR is an average interest rate, calculated based upon submissions from leading banks around the world, reflecting the rates those banks believe they would be charged if borrowing from other banks. LIBOR serves as the primary benchmark for short-term interest rates globally, and is used as a reference rate for many interest rate contracts, mortgages, credit cards, student loans and other consumer lending products. The Bank of International Settlements estimated that as of the second half of 2009, outstanding interest rate contracts were valued at approximately $450 trillion.

LIBOR, published by the British Bankers’ Association (BBA), a trade association based in London, is calculated for 10 currencies at 15 borrowing periods, known as maturities, ranging from overnight to one year. The LIBOR for a given currency at a specific maturity is the result of a calculation based upon submissions from a panel of banks for that currency (the Contributor Panel) selected by the BBA. From at least 2006 through 2010, RBS has been a member of the Contributor Panel for a number of currencies, including Yen LIBOR and Swiss Franc LIBOR, which are the focus of the plea agreement and DPA.

According to the filed charging documents, at various times from at least 2006 through 2010, certain RBS Yen and Swiss Franc derivatives traders – whose compensation was directly connected to their success in trading financial products tied to LIBOR – engaged in efforts to move LIBOR in a direction favorable to their trading positions. Through these schemes, RBS allegedly defrauded counterparties who were unaware of the manipulation affecting financial products referencing Yen and Swiss Franc LIBOR. The alleged schemes included hundreds of instances in which RBS employees sought to influence LIBOR submissions in a manner favorable to their trading positions in two principal ways: internally at RBS through requests by derivatives traders for Yen and Swiss Franc LIBOR submissions, and externally through an agreement with a separately charged derivatives trader to request Yen LIBOR submissions. The trader, Tom Alexander William Hayes, was formerly employed by a Japanese subsidiary of another Contributor Panel bank, UBS AG (UBS).

According to court documents, RBS employees engaged in this conduct through electronic communications, which included both emails and electronic chats. For example, in an electronic chat on March 16, 2009, an RBS Swiss Franc derivatives trader, (Trader-7), sought to benefit his trading book by asking the RBS LIBOR submitter (Submitter-1), "can we pls get a very very very low 3m [3 month] and 6m [6 month] fix today [please]" because "we have rather large fixings!" Submitter-1 responded, "perfect, if that’s what u want." After thanking Submitter-1, Trader-7 informed Submitter-1 that "from tomorrow . . . we need them thru the roof!!!!!"

In another electronic chat on May 20, 2009, involving an RBS Yen derivatives trader, ("Trader-2"), Submitter-1, and others, the following exchange occurred:

Trader-2: high 3s and low 6s pls [Submitter-1]

Submitter-1: no problems

Trader-2: grazias amigo . . . where will you lower 6s to?

Submitter-1: 70

That day, RBS’s 6-month Yen LIBOR submission dropped two basis points from .72 to .70, before reverting to .72 the following two days.

RBS employees also allegedly furthered their collusive scheme with Hayes to fix the price of derivative instruments tied to Yen LIBOR through electronic communications. For instance, in an electronic chat on April 20, 2007, Hayes requested that an RBS derivatives trader, ("Trader-3"), ask Submitter-1 for a low 3 month Yen LIBOR submission:

Hayes: . . . if you could ask your guys to keep 3m low wd be massive help as long as it doesn’t interfere with your stuff . . . tx in adavance.

Approximately 30 minutes later, Hayes and Trader-3 had the following exchange:

Hayes: mate did you manage to spk to your cash boys?

Trader-3: yes u owe me they are going 65 and 71

Hayes: thx mate yes i do . . . in fact i owe you big time

Approximately 45 minutes later, Hayes sent the following message to Trader-3:

Hayes: mater they set 64! . . . thats beyond the call of duty!

COMPANY HIT WITH $200 MILLION PENALTY FOR ATTEMPTING TO MANIPULATE GLOBAL INTEREST RATES

FROM:  COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION
CFTC Orders Barclays to pay $200 Million Penalty for Attempted Manipulation of and False Reporting concerning LIBOR and Euribor Benchmark Interest Rates.
The Order finds that Barclays attempted to manipulate interest rates and made related false reports to benefit its derivatives trading positions. The Order also finds that Barclays made false LIBOR reports at the direction of members of senior management to protect its reputation during the global financial crisis.

Washington, DC – The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) issued an Order today filing and settling charges against Barclays PLC, Barclays Bank PLC (Barclays Bank) and Barclays Capital Inc.(Barclays Capital) (collectively Barclays or the Bank). The Order finds that Barclays attempted to manipulate and made false reports concerning two global benchmark interest rates, LIBOR and Euribor, on numerous occasions and sometimes on a daily basis over a four-year period, commencing as early as 2005.

According to the Order, Barclays, through its traders and employees responsible for determining the Bank’s LIBOR and Euribor submissions (submitters), attempted to manipulate and made false reports concerning both benchmark interest rates to benefit the Bank’s derivatives trading positions by either increasing its profits or minimizing its losses. This conduct occurred regularly and was pervasive. In addition, the attempts to manipulate included Barclays’ traders asking other banks to assist in manipulating Euribor, as well as Barclays aiding attempts by other banks to manipulate U.S. Dollar LIBOR and Euribor.

The Order also finds that throughout the global financial crisis in late August 2007 through early 2009, as a result of instructions from Barclays’ senior management, the Bank routinely made artificially low LIBOR submissions to protect Barclays’ reputation from negative market and media perceptions concerning Barclays’ financial condition.

The CFTC Order requires Barclays to pay a $200 million civil monetary penalty, cease and desist from further violations as charged, and take specified steps, such as making the determinations of benchmark submissions transaction-focused (as set forth in the Order), to ensure the integrity and reliability of its LIBOR and Euribor submissions and improve related internal controls.

“The American public and our markets rely upon the integrity of benchmark interest rates like LIBOR and Euribor because they form the basis for hundreds of trillions of dollars of transactions and affect nearly every corner of the global economy,” said David Meister, the CFTC’s Director of Enforcement. “Banks that contribute information to those benchmarks must do so honestly. When a bank acts in its own self-interest by attempting to manipulate these rates for profit, or by submitting false reports that result from senior management orders to lower submissions to guard the bank’s reputation, the integrity of benchmark interest rates is undermined. The CFTC launched this investigation to protect the markets and the public from such illegal conduct, and today’s action demonstrates that we will bring the full force of our authority to bear as we carry out that mission.”
LIBOR and Euribor

LIBOR – the London Interbank Offered Rate – is among the most important benchmark interest rates in the world’s economy, and is a key rate in the United States. LIBOR is based on rate submissions from a relatively small and select panel of major banks, including Barclays, and is calculated and published daily for several different currencies by the British Banker’s Association (BBA). Each panel bank’s submission is also made public, and the market can therefore see each bank’s independent assessment of its own borrowing costs. LIBOR is supposed to reflect the cost of borrowing unsecured funds in the London interbank market.

Euribor, which is calculated in a similar fashion by the European Banking Federation (EBF), is another globally important rate that measures the cost of borrowing in the Economic and Monetary Union of the European Union.

LIBOR impacts enormous volumes of swaps and futures contracts, commercial and personal consumer loans, home mortgages and other transactions. For example, U.S. Dollar LIBOR is the basis for the settlement of the three-month Eurodollar futures contract traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME), which had a traded volume in 2011 with a notional value exceeding $564 trillion. In addition, according to the BBA, swaps with a notional value of approximately $350 trillion and loans amounting to $10 trillion are indexed to LIBOR. Euribor is also used internationally in derivatives contracts. In 2011, over-the-counter interest rate derivatives referenced to Euro rates had a notional value in excess of $220 trillion, according to the Bank for International Settlements. LIBOR and Euribor are relied upon by countless large and small businesses and individuals who trust that the rates are derived from candid and reliable submissions made by each of the banks on the panels.

Barclays’ Unlawful Conduct to Benefit Derivatives Trading Positions
As the Order shows, Barclays, in pursuit of its own self-interest, disregarded the fundamental principle that LIBOR and Euribor are supposed to reflect the costs of borrowing funds in certain markets. Barclays’ traders located at least in New York, London and Tokyo asked Barclays’ submitters to submit particular rates to benefit their derivatives trading positions, such as swaps or futures positions, which were priced on LIBOR and Euribor. Barclays’ traders made these unlawful requests routinely, and sometimes daily, from at least mid-2005 through at least the fall of 2007, and sporadically thereafter into 2009. The Order relates that, for example, one trader stated in an email to a submitter: “We have another big fixing tom[orrow] and with the market move I was hoping we could set [certain] Libors as high as possible.”

In addition, certain Barclays Euro swaps traders, led at the time by a senior trader, coordinated with and aided and abetted traders at other banks in each other’s attempts to manipulate Euribor, even scheming to impact Euribor on key standardized dates when many derivatives contracts are settled or reset.

The traders’ requests were frequently accepted by Barclays’ submitters, who emailed responses such as “always happy to help,” “for you, anything,” or “Done…for you big boy,” resulting in false submissions by Barclays to the BBA and EBF. The traders and submitters also engaged in similar conduct on fewer occasions with respect to Yen and Sterling LIBOR.

Barclays’ Unlawful Conduct at the Direction of Senior Management
The CFTC Order also finds that Barclays, acting at the direction of senior management, engaged in other serious unlawful conduct concerning LIBOR. In late 2007, Barclays was the subject of negative press reports raising questions such as, “So what the hell is happening at Barclays and its Barclays Capital securities unit that is prompting its peers to charge it premium interest in the money market?” Such negative media speculation caused significant concern within Barclays and was discussed among high levels of management within Barclays Bank. As a result, certain senior managers within Barclays instructed the U.S. Dollar LIBOR submitters and their supervisor to lower Barclays’ LIBOR submissions to be closer to the rates submitted by other banks and not so high as to attract media attention.

According to the Order, senior managers even coined the phrase “head above the parapet” to describe high LIBOR submissions relative to other banks. Barclays’ LIBOR submitters were told not to submit at levels where Barclays was “sticking its head above the parapet.” The directive was intended to fend off negative public perceptions about Barclays’ financial condition arising from its high LIBOR submissions relative to the submissions of other panel banks, which Barclays believed were too low given the market conditions.
Despite concerns being raised by the submitters that Barclays and other banks were, for example, “being dishonest by definition” and that they were submitting “patently false” rates, the submitters followed the directive and submitted artificially lower rates. The senior management directive for low U.S. Dollar LIBOR submissions occurred on a regular basis during the global financial crisis from August 2007 through early 2009, and, at limited times, for Yen and Sterling LIBOR during the same period. As the U.S. Dollar senior submitter said in October 2008 to his supervisor at the time, “following on from my conversation with you I will reluctantly, gradually and artificially get my libors in line with the rest of the contributors as requested. I disagree with this approach as you are well aware. I will be contributing rates which are nowhere near the clearing rates for unsecured cash and therefore will not be posting honest prices.”

Barclays’ Obligations to Ensure Integrity and Reliability of Benchmark Interest Rates
In addition to the $200 million penalty, the CFTC Order requires Barclays to implement measures to ensure that its submissions are transaction-focused, based upon a rigorous and honest assessment of information and not influenced by conflicts of interest. See pages 31-44 of the CFTC’s Order. Among other things, the Order requires Barclays to:
Make its submissions based on certain specified factors, with Barclays’ transactions being given the greatest weight, subject to certain specified adjustments and considerations;
Implement firewalls to prevent improper communications including between traders and submitters;
Prepare and retain certain documents concerning submissions, and retain relevant communications;
Implement auditing, monitoring and training measures concerning its submissions and related processes;
Make regular reports to the CFTC concerning compliance with the terms of the Order;
Use best efforts to encourage the development of rigorous standards for benchmark interest rates; and Continue to cooperate with the CFTC.

* * * *
The Order recognizes Barclays’ significant cooperation with the CFTC during the investigation of this matter.
In a related matter, as part of an agreement with the Fraud Section of the U.S. Justice Department’s Criminal Division, Barclays agreed to pay a $160 million penalty and to continue to cooperate with the Department. Furthermore, the United Kingdom’s Financial Services Authority (FSA) issued a Final Notice regarding its enforcement action against Barclays Bank PLC, and has imposed a penalty of £59.5 million against the Bank.

The CFTC thanks the FSA, the U.S. Department of Justice, the Washington Field Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for their assistance in the CFTC’s investigation.

CFTC Division of Enforcement staff members responsible for this case are Anne M. Termine, Stephen T. Tsai, Maura M. Viehmeyer, Brian G. Mulherin, Gretchen L. Lowe and Vincent A. McGonagle, with assistance from Philip P. Tumminio, Rishi K. Gupta, Russell Battaglia, Jeremy Cusimano, Elizabeth Padgett, Terry Mayo, Jason T. Wright, Aimée Latimer-Zayets, Timothy M. Kirby, Jonathan K. Huth, Susan A. Berkowitz and staff from the Division of Market Oversight and Office of the Chief Economist.