Saturday, March 14, 2015

AUTO PARTS STORE RECEIVES BAD NEWS REGARDING ASBESTOS, MOLD HAZARDS

FROM:  U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 
Advance Auto Parts exposes workers to asbestos, mold hazards
Kansas City, Missouri, store receives 11 violations

KANSAS CITY, Mo. — A worker alleging the existence of asbestos, mold and hygiene hazards led to an inspection of an Advance Auto Parts store in Kansas City, where the U.S. Department of Labor's Occupational Safety and Health Administration found one repeated and 10 serious safety and health violations with fines of $60,000.

"Exposure to asbestos is a dangerous workplace issue that can cause loss of lung function and cancer, among other serious health effects. When Advance Auto uses an older building with presumed asbestos-containing material, such as floor tiles, it has a responsibility to conduct periodic air monitoring and must post warning signs for workers," said Barbara Theriot, OSHA's area director in Kansas City. "The company also has a responsibility to maintain the building in a sanitary and safe manner. OSHA found persistent flooding, which caused mold growth and created lower-level slip and fall hazards. This is unacceptable."

OSHA inspectors tested bulk samples of furnace room floor tiles and found they contained 3 percent chrysotile, a form of asbestos. Sample air monitoring did not detect asbestos fibers circulating in the heating and air conditioning system. However, particles could become airborne from deteriorating tiles and persistent flooding, a consistent issue throughout the building.

Asbestos is a naturally occurring mineral fiber used in some building materials before its health dangers were discovered. Asbestos fibers are invisible and can be inhaled into the lungs unknowingly. Inhaled fibers can then become embedded in the lungs.

Inspectors also found electrical safety violations and blocked exit routes at the store, resulting in the 10 serious violations. An OSHA violation is serious if death or serious physical harm could result from a hazard an employer knew or should have known exists.

OSHA also noted a repeated violation for failing to provide inspectors with injury and illness logs. Based in Roanoke, Virginia, Advance Auto Parts was previously cited for this violation in a Delaware, Ohio, store in 2010 and a Lakeland, Florida, store in 2011. OSHA issues repeated violations if an employer was cited previously for the same or a similar violation within the last five years.
Advance Auto Parts has 15 business days from receipt of its citations and penalties to comply, request an informal conference with OSHA's area director, or contest the findings before the independent Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission.

Friday, March 13, 2015

DOJ ANNOUNCES COMMERZBANK AG TO FORFEIT $563 MILLION AND PAY $79 MILLION FINE

FROM:  U.S. JUSTICE DEPARTMENT 
Thursday, March 12, 2015
Commerzbank AG Admits to Sanctions and Bank Secrecy Violations, Agrees to Forfeit $563 Million and Pay $79 Million Fine
Combined with Payments to Regulators, Commerzbank to Pay $1.45 Billion

Commerzbank AG, a global financial institution headquartered in Frankfurt, Germany, and its U.S. branch, Commerzbank AG New York Branch (Commerz New York), have agreed to forfeit $563 million, pay a $79 million fine and enter into a deferred prosecution agreement with the Justice Department for violations of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA).  The bank has also entered into settlement agreements with the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

Assistant Attorney General Leslie R. Caldwell of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division, U.S. Attorney Ronald C. Machen Jr. of the District of Columbia, U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara of the Southern District of New York, Assistant Director in Charge Diego Rodriguez of the FBI’s New York Field Office, Chief Richard Weber of the Internal Revenue Service Criminal Investigation (IRS-CI) and District Attorney Cyrus R. Vance Jr. of New York County made the announcement.

In entering the deferred prosecution agreement, Commerzbank admitted and accepted responsibility for its criminal conduct in violation of IEEPA, and Commerz New York admitted its criminal conduct in violation of the BSA.  Commerzbank further agreed to pay $263 million in forfeiture and a fine of $79 million for the IEEPA violations, and to pay $300 million in forfeiture in connection with the BSA violations, which will be remitted to the victims of a multi-billion dollar securities fraud scheme that was permitted to operate through Commerzbank.  Commerzbank also agreed to implement rigorous internal controls and to cooperate fully with the Justice Department, including by reporting any criminal conduct by an employee.

A four-count felony criminal information was filed today in the District of Columbia charging Commerzbank with knowingly and willfully conspiring to commit violations of IEEPA and Commerz New York with three violations of the BSA for willfully failing to have an effective anti-money laundering (AML) program, willfully failing to conduct due diligence on its foreign correspondent accounts, and willfully failing to file suspicious activity reports.  Assuming the bank’s continued compliance with the deferred prosecution agreement, the government has agreed to defer prosecution for a period of three years, after which time, the government would seek to dismiss the charges.

The New York County District Attorney’s Office is also announcing today that Commerzbank has entered into a deferred prosecution agreement, and in the corresponding factual statement, Commerzbank admitted that it violated New York State law by falsifying the records of New York financial institutions.  In addition, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System is announcing that Commerzbank has agreed to a cease and desist order, to take certain remedial steps to ensure its compliance with U.S. law in its ongoing operations and to pay a civil monetary penalty of $200 million.  The New York State Department of Financial Services (DFS) is announcing Commerzbank has agreed to, among other things, pay a monetary penalty to DFS of $610 million.  The OFAC has also levied a fine of $258.6 million, which will be satisfied by payments made to the Justice Department.  In total, Commerzbank will pay $1.45 billion in penalties.

“Commerzbank concealed hundreds of millions of dollars in transactions prohibited by U.S. sanctions laws on behalf of Iranian and Sudanese businesses,” said Assistant Attorney General Caldwell.  “Commerzbank committed these crimes even though managers inside the bank raised red flags about its sanctions-violating practices.  Financial institutions must heed this message: banks that operate in the United States must comply with our laws, and banks that ignore the warnings of those charged with compliance will pay a very steep price.”

“Sanctions laws are designed to protect the national security of the United States and promote our foreign policy interests,” said U.S. Attorney Machen.  “Commerzbank undermined the integrity of our financial system and threatened our national security by hiding the business they were doing with entities in Iran and Sudan.  The bank tried to skirt our laws by hiding its illegal business with Iranian banks from its own employees in the United States.  Today’s resolution demonstrates that there will be consequences when global banks try to profit from the benefits of the U.S. financial system without respecting our laws.”

“Today, Commerzbank stands charged with Bank Secrecy Act criminal offenses for its acute, institutional anti-money laundering deficiencies that allowed over a billion dollars of the Olympus fraud to flow through its New York office,” said U.S. Attorney Bharara.  “These criminal charges follow a multi-year investigation and a guilty plea by a former Commerzbank Singapore employee who helped set up the structure that allowed for the Olympus fraud.  Institutions, not just individuals, have an obligation to follow the law, and anti-money laundering laws in particular are critical for financial institutions to follow.  With today’s resolution, the bank, as part of a deferred prosecution agreement, has accepted responsibility in a detailed statement of facts, agreed to continue reforming its anti-money laundering practices, and will pay $300 million that will go to victims of the Olympus fraud.”

“Today’s deferred prosecution agreement is a significant milestone – on an international stage – that reaffirms our clear message to other global financial institutions,” said Chief Weber.  “IRS-CI’s work in this investigation – as well as the prior sanction cases – has resulted in fundamental changes in the way banks operate worldwide.  IRS-CI and our partners will continue to hold financial institutions accountable for international criminal violations.”

“Today, we announce more charges against yet another bank,” said Assistant Director in Charge Rodriguez.  “Commerzbank violated the Bank Secrecy Act designed to prevent the movement of money, often with nefarious intent.  Commerzbank enabled Olympus to evade detection for years.  And worse yet, failed to create a process to prevent this criminal behavior.  Management at banks and financial institutions should heed this warming: This behavior will be investigated, vigorously.”

“We have sanctions in place to prevent rogue nations and terrorists from accessing the U.S. financial system,” said District Attorney Vance.  “In order to have teeth, sanctions need to be enforced and Manhattan financial institutions need to be protected from being unwittingly used by bad actors.  Over the course of eight settlements, my office and our partners have sent a strong message of enforcement that has led to the transformation of compliance in this area.”

IEEPA Violations

According to admissions contained in the deferred prosecution agreement, from 2002 to 2008, Commerzbank knowingly and willfully moved $263 million through the U.S. financial system on behalf of Iranian and Sudanese entities subject to U.S. economic sanctions.  Commerzbank engaged in this criminal conduct using numerous schemes designed to conceal the true nature of the illicit transactions from U.S. regulators.

For example, in the deferred prosecution agreement, Commerzbank acknowledged that it used non-transparent payment messages, known as cover payments, to conceal the involvement of sanctioned entities, and also removed information identifying sanctioned entities from payment messages, in transactions processed through Commerz New York and other financial institutions in the United States.  Specifically, in 2003, Commerzbank designated a group of employees in the Frankfurt back office to review and amend Iranian payments so that the payments would not be stopped by U.S. sanctions filters.  In doing so, Commerzbank ensured that Iranian payment messages did not mention the Iranian entity, as transactions may have otherwise been stopped pursuant to the U.S. sanctions.

Commerzbank admitted that it hid these practices from Commerz New York.  For example, in 2003, when two state-owned Iranian banks wanted to begin routing their U.S. dollar clearing business through Commerzbank, a Commerzbank back office employee emailed other Commerzbank employees directing: “If for whatever reason CB New York inquires why our turnover has increase[d] so dramatically, under no circumstances may anyone mention that there is a connection to the clearing of Iranian banks!!!!!!!!!!!!!.”

Commerzbank admitted that this conduct continued even though its senior management was warned that the bank’s practices for Iranian clients “raised concerns.”  For example, in October 2003, the head of Commerzbank’s internal audit division stated in an email to a member of Commerzbank’s senior management that Iranian bank names in payment messages going to the United States were being “neutralized” and warned: “it raises concerns if we consciously reference the suppression of the ordering party in our work procedures in order to avoid difficulties in the processing of payments with the U.S.A.”

In another scheme designed to avoid U.S. sanctions, Commerzbank admitted that, in 2004, it agreed with an Iranian bank client that, rather than sending direct wire payments to the United States, the Iranian bank would pay U.S. beneficiaries with Commerzbank-issued checks listing only the Iranian bank’s account number and address in London with no mention of the Iranian bank’s name.

Additionally, Commerzbank admitted that in 2005, it created a “safe payment solution” for an Iranian shipping company client, which allowed the client to conduct transactions using the U.S. financial system.  The safe payment solution involved routing payments through special purpose entities controlled by the Iranian company, which were incorporated outside of Iran and bore no obvious connection to the Iranian client.  Commerzbank and its client switched use of such special purpose entities when Commerz New York’s sanctions compliance filters were updated to detect the use of a particular special purpose entity.  Commerzbank continued to process payments on behalf the Iranian client even after the client had been designated by OFAC as an entity subject to U.S. sanctions for its involvement in weapons of mass destruction proliferation.  

In addition, Commerzbank admitted that, from 2002 to 2007, it provided Sudanese sanctioned entities with access to the U.S. financial system by engaging in similar schemes to remove reference to Sudanese companies from the transaction records.  

Olympus Accounting Fraud

Since 2008, and continuing until at least 2013, Commerz New York violated the BSA and its implementing regulations.  Specifically, Commerz New York failed to maintain adequate policies, procedures and practices to ensure its compliance with U.S. law, including its obligation to detect and report suspicious activity.  As a result of the wilful failure of Commerz New York to comply with U.S. law, a multibillion-dollar securities fraud was operated through Commerzbank and Commerz New York.

Olympus was a Japanese-based manufacturer of medical devices and cameras.  Its common stock is listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange, and its American Depository Receipts trade in the United States.  From at least the late 1990s through 2011, Olympus perpetrated a massive accounting fraud designed to conceal from its auditors and investors hundreds of millions of dollars in losses.  In September 2012, Olympus and three of its senior executives pleaded guilty in Japan to inflating the company’s net worth by approximately $1.7 billion.

Olympus used Commerzbank and Commerz New York to perpetrate its fraud.  Commerzbank, through its branch and affiliates in Singapore, both loaned money to off-balance-sheet entities created by or for Olympus to perpetrate its fraud, and transacted more than $1.6 billion through Commerz New York in furtherance of the fraud.

Commerzbank and Commerz New York were used in furtherance of the Olympus fraud during two different time periods.  From approximately 1999 through 2000, Olympus perpetrated its fraud primarily through Commerzbank and its Singapore branch and affiliates.  Among other things, Olympus used special purpose vehicles to facilitate the fraud, some of which were created by Commerzbank – including several executives based in Singapore – at Olympus’s direction, using funding from Commerzbank.  One of those Singapore-based executives, Chan Ming Fon, was involved in creating the Olympus structure in 1999 while at Commerzbank (Southeast Asia) Ltd., and later managed an Olympus-related entity in 2005-2010 on behalf of which he submitted false confirmations to Olympus’s auditors.  In September 2013, Chan pleaded guilty in Manhattan federal court to conspiracy to commit wire fraud.

From 1999 through 2000, Olympus executives asked Commerzbank executives to provide certain false documents to Olympus’s auditors, which would have failed to disclose that certain Olympus assets were pledged as collateral for loans from a Commerzbank affiliate.  Commerzbank obtained a legal opinion, which, in the words of one Commerzbank executive written to an Olympus executive, “ma[de] clear that our bank could be subject to both civil and criminal penalties if we are seen to be assisting or facilitating you in the non-disclosure.”  Although Commerzbank ultimately declined to provide the false documents, its executives suggested a variety of ways Olympus could nonetheless fail to disclose the pledge.

In 2000, Olympus took its business away from Commerzbank and transferred it to another bank.  In 2005, however, Olympus – and its fraud – returned to Commerzbank.  From that point until at least 2010, Commerzbank executives expressed strong suspicions about the Olympus transactions and structure.  One senior executive worried that Olympus would have to “write off [the] full amount” of the relevant transactions, and wondered about the effects on Commerzbank if “any negative news is splash[ed] on the front page.”  A senior legal and compliance officer responsible for Commerzbank’s Singapore branch and affiliates wrote at the time that he was “concerned” about fraud, asset stripping, market manipulation and tax offenses, and that “[i]f the [Olympus] structure and transactions can not [be] explained we must file Suspicious Transaction report as a matter of law and [Commerzbank] policy.”            

In March 2010, two wire transfers in the amounts of approximately $455 million and $67 million, respectively, related to the Olympus scheme were processed by Commerz New York through the correspondent account for the Singapore branch of Commerzbank.  Those wires caused Commerz New York’s automated AML monitoring software to “alert.”

At the time, Commerz New York had conducted no due diligence on the Singapore branch and affiliates of Commerzbank, consistent with Commerzbank’s policy of not conducting due diligence on its own branches and affiliates.  In response to the alerts, however, Commerz New York sent a request for information to Commerz Frankfurt and Commerzbank’s Singapore branch, inquiring about the transactions.  The Singapore branch responded in a brief e-mail, dated April 20, 2010, referring to the Olympus-related entities involved in the wires:

GPA Investments Ltd. ist [sic] a Caymen Islands SPV, Creative Dragons SPC-Sub Fund E is a CITS administered fund both of which are part of an SPC structure to manage securities investments for an FATF country based MNC.

According to the Relationship Manager the payment reflects the proceeds from such securities investments to be reinvested.

Commerzbank’s Singapore branch did not relay any of the concerns about the Olympus-sponsored structures and transactions.

Based on its response, Commerz New York closed the alert without taking any further action other than to note that in March 2010 alone, GPA Investments had been involved in six transactions through Commerz New York totalling more than $522 million.  In fact, between 1999 and 2010, a total of more than $1.6 billion in furtherance of the Olympus fraud was cleared through Commerz New York.  Commerz New York failed to file a SAR in the United States concerning Olympus or any of the Olympus-related entities until November 2013 – more than two years after the Olympus accounting fraud was revealed.

Commerz New York had the same designated BSA Officer continuously from approximately 2003 until early 2014.  Over those years, she raised concerns about AML compliance, both to her superiors at Commerz New York and with Commerz Frankfurt.

Under the BSA, a financial institution is required to detect and report suspicious activity.  This is accomplished, in part, through conducting due diligence, and enhanced due diligence where appropriate, of the correspondent relationship – which Commerz New York failed to do – and by sending requests for further information to the correspondent bank when potentially suspicious transactions are detected.  Commerz New York frequently had difficulties getting responses to requests for information generated in connection with automated transaction monitoring “alerts.”  Because requests for information went unanswered for as much as eight months without SARs being filed, alerts were often closed without any response to the pending request.  As a result of these deficiencies, Commerz New York cleared numerous AML “alerts” based on its own perfunctory Internet searches and searches of public source databases but without ever receiving responses to its requests for information.

On June 24, 2010, a Commerz New York-based compliance officer who had primary responsibility for automated transaction monitoring wrote in an e‑mail to the BSA Officer and the Head of Compliance in New York (who had previously served as the Head of Compliance in Asia) that “we currently have 90 alerts a day,” with “808 alerts outstanding,” which “could lead to a possible back log.”  He continued, “I also wanted to make you aware that we have currently over 130 Frankfurt RFIs [i.e., requests for information] outstanding,” noting “a decrease in response to the RFIs” from Frankfurt.  The following day, the Head of Compliance in New York forwarded the e‑mail to Commerz’s Global Head of Compliance, adding that “things are not getting better with regards to th[ose] findings. (see below).  I will forward you the DRAFT memo on potential revision of staffing needs.”  Although the Global Head of Compliance thereafter instituted new procedures designed to increase the speed of responses to RFIs from New York, problems persisted with the timely flow of information from business units outside the United States to compliance officers in New York.

Commerzbank and Commerz New York also failed to conduct adequate due diligence or to obtain “know your customer” information with respect to correspondent bank accounts for Commerzbank’s own foreign branches and affiliates.  These systemic deficiencies reflected a failure to maintain adequate policies, procedures and controls to ensure compliance with the BSA and regulations prescribed thereunder and to guard against money laundering.

This case was investigated by the IRS-Criminal Investigation’s Washington D.C. Field Division and FBI’s New York Field Office.  This case is being prosecuted by Trial Attorney Sarah Devlin of the Criminal Division’s Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section, Assistant U.S. Attorneys Matt Graves, Maia Miller, Crystal Boodoo and Zia Faruqui of the District of Columbia, and Assistant U.S. Attorney Bonnie Jonas of the Southern District of New York.

The New York County District Attorney’s Office also conducted its own investigation in conjunction with the Justice Department.  The Federal Reserve Bank of New York, DFS and OFAC provided substantial assistance with this investigation.

Thursday, March 12, 2015

HOME HEALTH CARE COMPANY TO PAY $1.1 MILLION TO RESOLVE ALLEGATIONS OF IMPROPERLY PAYING DOCTORS FOR REFERRALS

FROM:  U.S. JUSTICE DEPARTMENT 
Monday, March 9, 2015
Florida Home Health Care Company Agrees to Pay $1.1 Million to Resolve False Claims Act Allegations

Recovery Home Care Inc., Recovery Home Care Services Inc. (collectively Recovery Home Care) and National Home Care Holdings LLC have agreed to pay $1.1 million to resolve allegations that the Recovery Home Care entities violated the False Claims Act by improperly paying doctors for referrals of home health care services provided to Medicare patients, the Department of Justice announced today.  The Recovery Home Care entities provide home health care services to Medicare beneficiaries and were purchased by National Home Care Holdings LLC in 2012, after the conduct addressed by the settlement occurred.

“Health care providers that attempt to profit by providing illegal inducements will be held accountable,” said Acting Assistant Attorney General Benjamin C. Mizer of the Justice Department’s Civil Division.  “We will continue to advocate for the appropriate use of Medicare funds and the proper care of our senior citizens.”

From 2009 through 2012, Recovery Home Care, headquartered in West Palm Beach, Florida, allegedly paid dozens of physicians thousands of dollars per month to perform patient chart reviews.  According to the government’s lawsuit, the physicians were over-compensated for any actual work they performed and, in reality, payments to the physicians were used to induce them to refer their patients to Recovery Home Care, in violation of the Anti-Kickback Statute and the Stark Law.

“Inducements of this kind are designed to improperly influence a physician’s independent medical judgment,” said U.S. Attorney A. Lee Bentley III of the Middle District of Florida.  “This lawsuit and today’s settlement attests to our office’s on-going commitment to safeguard federal health care program beneficiaries from the effects of such illegal conduct.”

The Anti-Kickback Statute and the Stark Law are intended to ensure that a physician’s medical judgment is not compromised by improper financial incentives.  The Anti-Kickback Statute prohibits offering, paying, soliciting or receiving remuneration to induce referrals of items or services covered by federal health care programs, including Medicare.  The Stark Law forbids a home health care provider from billing Medicare for certain services referred by physicians who have a financial relationship with the entity.

The settlement partially resolves allegations made in a lawsuit filed in federal court in Tampa, Florida, by Gregory Simony, a former employee of Recovery Home Care.  The lawsuit was filed under the qui tam, or whistleblower, provisions of the False Claims Act, which permit private individuals to sue on behalf of the government for false claims and to share in any recovery.  The act also allows the government to intervene and take over the action, as it did in part in this case.  Simony will receive $198,000 of the recovered funds.  The government continues to litigate this case against Recovery Home Care’s previous owner, Mark Conklin.

This settlement illustrates the government’s emphasis on combating health care fraud and marks another achievement for the Health Care Fraud Prevention and Enforcement Action Team (HEAT) initiative, which was announced in May 2009 by the Attorney General and the Secretary of Health and Human Services.  The partnership between the two departments has focused efforts to reduce and prevent Medicare and Medicaid financial fraud through enhanced cooperation.  One of the most powerful tools in this effort is the False Claims Act.  Since January 2009, the Justice Department has recovered a total of more than $23.8 billion through False Claims Act cases, with more than $15.2 billion of that amount recovered in cases involving fraud against federal health care programs.

The settlement was the result of a coordinated effort by the Civil Division’s Commercial Litigation Branch, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Middle District of Florida and HHS-OIG.    

The case is captioned United States ex rel. Simony v. Recovery Home Care, et al., Case No. 8-12-cv-2495-T-36TBM (M.D. Fla.).  The claims resolved by the settlement are allegations only and there has been no determination of liability.

Wednesday, March 11, 2015

CITATION ISSUED, CONTRACTOR COULD PAY $55,000 PENALTY FOR SAFETY VIOLATIONS RELATED TO EXCAVATION COLLAPSE

FROM:  U.S. LABOR DEPARTMENT
Auburn, Alabama contractor exposes workers to cave-in hazards; fails to use safety measures to prevent excavation collapse
Employer name: D&J Enterprises, Inc.
Inspection site: 2151 Interstate Drive Opelika, Alabama 36801

Date inspection initiated: The Occupational Safety and Health Administration initiated the Jan. 14, 2015 inspection as part of the agency's National Emphasis Program on Trenching and Excavation.

Inspection findings: OSHA issued the employer one willful citation for allowing employees to work in an excavation without cave-in protection. OSHA requires that all trenches and excavation sites 5-feet or deeper be protected against sidewall collapses. Protection may be provided through shoring of trench walls, sloping of the soil at a shallow angle or by using a protective trench box.

Quote: "D&J Enterprises' management recognized that there was a possible cave-in hazard and had the means to correct the hazard, yet opted to provide no protection for employees in the excavation," said Joseph Roesler, OSHA's area director in Mobile. "There is no excuse for an employer to put their employees in unprotected trenches and excavations. The technology and training have been available for employers for decades."
Proposed penalties: $55,000

Tuesday, March 10, 2015

METLIFE HOME LOANS LLC, TO PAY $123.5 MILLION TO RESOLVE ALLEGED FHA MORTGAGE LENDNG VIOLATIONS

FROM:  U.S. JUSTICE DEPARTMENT 
Wednesday, February 25, 2015
MetLife Home Loans LLC, Successor to MetLife Bank N.A., to Pay $123.5 Million to Resolve Alleged Federal Housing Administration Mortgage Lending Violations

MetLife Home Loans LLC has agreed to pay the United States $123.5 million to resolve allegations that MetLife Bank N.A. (MetLife Bank) violated the False Claims Act by knowingly originating and underwriting mortgage loans insured by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD) Federal Housing Administration (FHA) that did not meet applicable requirements, the Justice Department announced today.

MetLife Bank was a banking services company headquartered in Bridgewater, New Jersey.  In June 2013, MetLife Bank merged into MetLife Home Loans LLC, a mortgage finance company headquartered in Irving, Texas.  MetLife Bank was, and MetLife Home Loans LLC is, a wholly owned subsidiary of MetLife Inc., a holding company headquartered in New York City.

“MetLife Bank’s improper FHA lending practices not only wasted taxpayer funds, but also inflicted harm on homeowners and the housing market that lasts to this day,” said Acting Assistant Attorney General Joyce R. Branda of the Justice Department’s Civil Division.  “As this settlement shows, we will continue to hold accountable financial institutions that elected to ignore the rules and to pursue their own financial interests at the expense of hardworking Americans.”

“MetLife Bank took advantage of the FHA insurance program by knowingly turning a blind eye to mortgage loans that did not meet basic underwriting requirements, and stuck the FHA and taxpayers with the bill when those mortgages defaulted,” said U.S. Attorney John Walsh of the District of Colorado.  “This settlement is part of our systematic, national effort to hold lenders accountable for irresponsible lending practices that not only harmed FHA, but also contributed to a catastrophic wave of home foreclosures across the country.”

During the time period covered by the settlement, MetLife Bank participated as a Direct Endorsement Lender (DEL) in the FHA insurance program.  A DEL has the authority to originate, underwrite and certify mortgages for FHA insurance.  If a loan certified for FHA insurance later defaults, the holder of the loan may submit an insurance claim to the FHA for the losses resulting from the defaulted loan.  Because the FHA does not review the underwriting of a loan before it is endorsed for FHA insurance, the FHA depends on a DEL to follow program rules to ensure that only eligible loans are submitted for FHA insurance.

As part of the settlement, MetLife Home Loans LLC admitted to the following facts: From September 2008 through March 2012, it repeatedly certified for FHA insurance mortgage loans that did not meet HUD underwriting requirements.  MetLife Bank was aware that a substantial percentage of these loans were not eligible for FHA mortgage insurance due to its own internal quality control findings.  According to these findings, between January 2009 and August 2010, the portion of MetLife Bank loans containing the most serious category of deficiencies, which MetLife Bank called “material/significant,” ranged from 25 percent to more than 60 percent.  These quality control findings were routinely shared with MetLife Bank’s senior managers, including the chief executive officer and board of directors.  While the overall “significant” error rate identified by MetLife Bank decreased in 2010 and 2011, during the same time period, MetLife Bank more frequently downgraded FHA loans from “significant” to “moderate.”  In one instance, a quality control employee wrote in an email discussing MetLife Bank’s practice of downgrading its quality control findings: “Why say Significant when it feels so Good to say MODERATE.”  Overall, between January 2009 and December 2011, MetLife Bank identified 1,097 FHA mortgage loans underwritten by MetLife Bank with a “significant” finding, but despite an obligation to self-report findings of material violations of FHA requirements, MetLife Bank only self-reported 321 mortgages to HUD.  MetLife Bank’s conduct caused FHA to insure hundreds of loans that were not eligible for insurance and, as a result, FHA suffered substantial losses when it later paid insurance claims on those loans.

“The settlement announced today is the culmination of two years of work by HUD OIG and our continued efforts to identify and properly respond to instances of fraud against HUD’s mortgage insurance program,” said Inspector General David Montoya of HUD.

“We appreciate that MetLife Bank has accepted responsibility for its actions and is settling with the government,” said General Counsel Helen Kanovsky of HUD.  “We want to thank the Department of Justice and HUD’s Office of Inspector General for all of their efforts in helping us make this settlement a reality.  This settlement with MetLife Bank underscores our consistent message that HUD takes compliance with its requirements seriously.”

The settlement was the result of a joint investigation conducted by HUD, HUD OIG, the Civil Division and the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Colorado.

Monday, March 9, 2015

GUILTY PLEA GIVEN IN $5 MILLION HEALTH CARE FRAUD

FROM:  U.S. JUSTICE DEPARTMENT 
Tuesday, February 24, 2015
Former Owner of Durable Medical Equipment Company Pleads Guilty in $5 Million Health Care Fraud Scheme
A Miami man pleaded guilty today to health care fraud charges in connection with a $5 million scheme to defraud Medicare.

Assistant Attorney General Leslie R. Caldwell of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division, U.S. Attorney Wifredo A. Ferrer of the Southern District of Florida, Special Agent in Charge Derrick Jackson of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General’s (HHS-OIG) Miami Field Office, Special Agent in Charge Mike Fields of HHS-OIG’s Dallas Field Office, Special Agent in Charge Paul Wysopal of the FBI’s Tampa Field Office, and Special Agent in Charge Perrye K. Turner of the FBI’s Houston Field Office made the announcement.

Angel M. Mirabal, 62, of Miami, Florida, pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and health care fraud before U.S. District Judge Marcia G. Cooke of the Southern District of Florida.  A sentencing hearing is scheduled for May 6, 2015.

In connection with his guilty plea, Mirabal admitted that he was the owner, president and manager of Quick Solutions Medical Supplies Inc. (Quick Solutions), a durable medical equipment (DME) supply company located in Houston, Texas.  Mirabel further admitted that from April 2010 through July 2013, he and his co-conspirators operated Quick Solutions for the purpose of billing the Medicare program for, among other things, expensive DME that was medically unnecessary and in many instances not provided to the Medicare beneficiaries.  Indeed, many of the beneficiaries who purportedly received the DME resided hundreds of miles away in Miami.

From June 2011 through February 2012, Quick Solutions submitted approximately $5 million in fraudulent claims, and Medicare paid approximately $587,900 for these claims.

This case was investigated by the FBI, HHS-OIG and Texas Attorney General’s Medicaid Fraud Control Unit, and was brought as part of the Medicare Fraud Strike Force, under the supervision of the Criminal Division’s Fraud Section and U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Florida.  This case is being prosecuted by Trial Attorney Timothy P. Loper of the Criminal Division’s Fraud Section.

Since its inception in March 2007, the Medicare Fraud Strike Force, now operating in nine cities across the country, has charged nearly 2,100 defendants who have collectively billed the Medicare program for more than $6.5 billion.  In addition, the HHS Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, working in conjunction with the HHS-OIG, are taking steps to increase accountability and decrease the presence of fraudulent providers.

Sunday, March 8, 2015

MOBILE TESTING DEVICE EMPLOYER PAYS OVER 266K OWED TO WORKERS

FROM:  U.S. LABOR DEPARTMENT 

Mobile testing device employer pays more than $266,000 to 118 employees following US Labor Department investigations in Texas and Washington
Employer: Device Inside Inc., which provides mobile device testing and other related services for Samsung.

Site: Corporate office in Dallas, Texas and a branch office in Bellevue, Washington

Investigation findings: The Seattle Wage and Hour district office found 46 employees were owed $149,671 while the Dallas district office found that 72 employees were owed $116,662 in back wages. Systemic violations at both locations include wrongly classifying salaried engineers and drivers as exempt from overtime requirements.  The company also failed to include bonuses in overtime pay computations and failed to keep accurate records. Additionally, the employer, in some cases, improperly deducted time from workers' pay for breaks under 20 minutes long, which count as work time. The company agreed to comply with the FLSA in the future. All back wages have been paid by the employer.

Quote: "This is a great example of how the Wage and Hour Division addresses corporate-wide compliance across multiple geographical locations," said Cynthia Watson, regional administrator for the Wage and Hour Division in the Southwest. "We are pleased that the employer has corrected its pay practices to comply with the law and that employees have received the wages they rightfully earned."

Back wages paid: $266,334