DOJ SETTLES FOR $5 MILLION IN ILLEGAL PREMERGER COORDINATION CASE

FROM:  U.S. JUSTICE DEPARTMENT 

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 7, 2014

JUSTICE DEPARTMENT REACHES $5 MILLION SETTLEMENT WITH FLAKEBOARD, ARAUCO, INVERSIONES ANGELINI AND SIERRAPINE FOR

ILLEGAL PREMERGER COORDINATION

Department Obtains Civil Penalties of $3.8 Million and Disgorgement of $1.15 Million

WASHINGTON — The department today announced a settlement with Flakeboard America Limited; its parent companies, Celulosa Arauco y Constitución S.A. and Inversiones Angelini y Compañía Limitada; and SierraPine.  The settlement requires the companies to pay a combined $3.8 million in civil penalties for violating the Hart–Scott–Rodino (HSR) Act of 1976.  In addition, for violating Section 1 of the Sherman Act, Flakeboard must disgorge $1.15 million in illegally obtained profits and both Flakeboard and SierraPine must establish antitrust compliance programs and agree to certain restrictions.

The settlement resolves the department’s allegations that Flakeboard, Arauco and SierraPine engaged in illegal premerger coordination while Flakeboard’s proposed acquisition of three SierraPine mills was under antitrust review by the Department of Justice.

Flakeboard and SierraPine abandoned the proposed acquisition on Sept. 30, 2014, after the department expressed concerns about the transaction’s likely anticompetitive effects in the production of medium-density fiberboard (MDF).  MDF is a manufactured wood product widely used in furniture, kitchen cabinets, and decorative mouldings.

The department today filed, in U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, a civil antitrust complaint alleging violations of the HSR Act (Section 7A of the Clayton Act) and Section 1 of the Sherman Act.  At the same time, the department filed an agreement that, if approved by the court, would resolve the lawsuit.

“Companies proposing to merge must remain separate and independent during the government’s investigation,” said Bill Baer, Assistant Attorney General of the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division.  “These two competitors did not.  Instead they closed a plant and allocated customers when they should have been competing vigorously.  As a result both companies are paying substantial civil penalties and Flakeboard is being forced to surrender the ill-gotten profit it gained from violating the antitrust laws.”

According to the complaint, before the proposed acquisition, SierraPine operated particleboard mills in Springfield, Oregon, and Martell, California, that competed directly with Flakeboard’s particleboard mill in Albany, Oregon.  Particleboard is an unfinished wood product that is widely used in countertops, shelving, low-end furniture, and other finished products.  The Springfield and Martell mills were included in the proposed acquisition along with a third SierraPine mill that produced MDF.  The complaint alleges that after announcing the proposed acquisition on Jan. 14, 2014, and before the expiration of the HSR Act’s mandatory premerger waiting period, Flakeboard, Arauco, and SierraPine illegally coordinated to close SierraPine’s particleboard mill in Springfield, Oregon, and move the mill’s customers to Flakeboard.  This unlawful coordination led to the permanent shutdown of the Springfield mill on March 13, 2014, and enabled Flakeboard to secure a significant number of Springfield’s customers for its Albany mill.  The defendants’ conduct constituted an illegal agreement to restrain trade in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, and prematurely transferred operational control, and therefore beneficial ownership, of SierraPine’s business to Flakeboard in violation of the HSR Act.

The HSR Act requires companies planning acquisitions or mergers that meet certain thresholds to file premerger notification documents with the department and the Federal Trade Commission.  The HSR Act also requires that the merging parties observe a mandatory waiting period before proceeding with the transaction.  If the government determines that a transaction violates the antitrust laws, it may seek to block that transaction before the waiting period expires.  Each party is subject to a maximum civil penalty of $16,000 per day for each day they violate the HSR Act.

The complaint alleges that the defendants’ HSR Act violation occurred from January 17, 2014, when Flakeboard and SierraPine began coordinating on the closure of the Springfield mill, until the expiration of the waiting period on Aug. 27, 2014.  The companies cooperated with the investigation by voluntarily providing the department with evidence of their unlawful premerger conduct, which was a significant factor in the department’s decision to reduce the maximum HSR penalty.  The $1.15 million in disgorgement under the Sherman Act represents a reasonable approximation of the ill-gotten profit Flakeboard received as a result of the parties’ coordination to close Springfield and move the mill’s customers to Flakeboard.

Flakeboard is a Delaware corporation with its U.S. headquarters in Fort Mill, South Carolina.  Flakeboard’s parent company is Celulosa Arauco y Constitución (Arauco), which is held by Inversiones Angelini y Compañía Limitada, a Chilean corporation headquartered in Santiago, Chile, and the ultimate parent entity named on the HSR filing.

SierraPine is a California limited partnership headquartered in Roseville, California.

As required by the Tunney Act, the proposed settlement, along with the department’s competitive impact statement, will be published in the Federal Register.  Any person may submit written comments concerning the proposed settlement during a 60-day comment period to Peter Mucchetti, Chief, Litigation I Section, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice, 450 5th Street, N.W., Suite 4100, Washington, D.C. 20530.  At the conclusion of the 60-day comment period, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia may enter the proposed final judgment upon finding that it is in the public interest.

HEALTHCARE COMPANY TO PAY $350 MILLION TO SETTLE FALSE CLAIMS ACT ALLEGATIONS

FROM:  U.S. JUSTICE DEPARTMENT 

Wednesday, October 22, 2014

DaVita to Pay $350 Million to Resolve Allegations of Illegal Kickbacks

DaVita Healthcare Partners, Inc., one of the leading providers of dialysis services in the United States, has agreed to pay $350 million to resolve claims that it violated the False Claims Act by paying kickbacks to induce the referral of patients to its dialysis clinics, the Justice Department announced today. DaVita is headquartered in Denver, Colorado and has dialysis clinics in 46 states and the District of Columbia.

The settlement today resolves allegations that, between March 1, 2005 and February 1, 2014, DaVita identified physicians or physician groups that had significant patient populations suffering renal disease and offered them lucrative opportunities to partner with DaVita by acquiring and/or selling an interest in dialysis clinics to which their patients would be referred for dialysis treatment. DaVita further ensured referrals of these patients to the clinics through a series of secondary agreements with the physicians, including  entering into agreements in which the physician agreed not to compete with the DaVita clinic and non-disparagement agreements that would have prevented the physicians from referring their patients to other dialysis providers.

“Health care providers should generate business by offering their patients superior quality services or more convenient options, not by entering into contractual agreements designed to induce physicians to provide referrals,” said Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the Justice Department’s Civil Division Jonathan F. Olin. “The Justice Department is committed to protecting the integrity of our healthcare system and ensuring that financial arrangements in the healthcare marketplace comply with the law.”

The government alleged that DaVita used a three part joint venture business model to induce patient referrals.  First, using information gathered from numerous sources, DaVita identified physicians or physician groups that had significant patient populations suffering renal disease within a specific geographic area. DaVita would then gather specific information about the physicians or physician group to determine if they would be a “winning practice.” In one transaction, a physician’s group was considered a “winning practice” because the physicians were “young and in debt.”  Based on this careful vetting process, DaVita knew and expected that many, if not most, of the physicians’ patients would be referred to the joint venture dialysis clinics.

Next, DaVita would offer the targeted physician or physician group a lucrative opportunity to enter into a joint venture involving DaVita’s acquisition of an interest in dialysis clinics owned by the physicians, and/or DaVita’s sale of an interest in its dialysis clinics to the physicians. To make the transaction financially attractive to potential physician partners, DaVita would manipulate the financial models used to value the transaction.  For example, to decrease the apparent value of clinics it was selling, DaVita would employ an assumption it referred to as the “HIPPER compression,” which was based on a speculative and arbitrary projection that future payments for dialysis treatments by commercial insurance companies would be cut by as much as half in future years. These manipulations resulted in physicians paying less for their interest in the joint ventures and realizing returns on investment which were extraordinarily high, with pre-tax annual returns exceeding 100 percent in some instances.

Last, DaVita ensured future patient referrals through a series of secondary agreements with their physician partners. These included paying the physicians to serve as medical directors of the joint venture clinics, and entering into agreements in which the physicians agreed not to compete with the clinic. The non-compete agreements were structured so that they bound all physicians in a practice group, even if some of the physicians were not part of the joint venture arrangements. These agreements also included provisions prohibiting the physician partners from inducing or advising a patient to seek treatment at a competing dialysis clinic. These agreements were of such importance to DaVita that it would not conclude a joint venture transaction without them.

The Government’s complaint identifies a joint venture with a physicians’ group in central Florida as one of several examples illustrating DaVita’s scheme to improperly induce patient referrals. The group had previously been in a joint venture arrangement involving dialysis clinics with Gambro, Inc., a dialysis company acquired by DaVita in 2005. Prior to the acquisition, Gambro had entered into a settlement with the United States to resolve alleged kickback allegations that, among other things, required Gambro to unwind its joint venture agreements. As a consequence, Gambro purchased the group’s interest in the joint venture clinics and agreed to a “carve-out” of the associated non-competition agreement which allowed the group to open its own dialysis clinic nearby, which it did. After acquiring Gambro, DaVita bought a majority position in the group’s newly established dialysis clinic, and sold a minority position in three DaVita-owned clinics. Despite the fact that each of the clinics involved were roughly comparable in terms of size and profits, DaVita agreed to pay $5,975,000 to acquire a 60 percent interest in the group’s clinic, while selling a 40 percent interest in the three clinics it owned for a total of $3,075,000. As part of this joint venture, the group agreed to enter into new non-compete agreements.

“This case involved a sophisticated scheme to compensate doctors illegally for referring patients to DaVita’s dialysis centers.   Federal law protects patients by making buying and selling patient referrals illegal, so as to ensure that the interest of the patient is the exclusive factor in the referral decision,” said U.S. Attorney John Walsh.  “When a company pays doctors and/or their practice groups for patient referrals, the company’s focus is not on the patient, but on the profit to be extracted from providing services to the patient.”

In conjunction with today’s announcement, the U.S. Attorney’s Office noted that after extensive review, it is closing its criminal investigation of two specific joint ventures.

As part of the settlement announced today, DaVita has also agreed to a Civil Forfeiture in the amount of $39 million based upon conduct related to two specific joint venture transactions entered into in Denver, Colorado.   Additionally, DaVita has entered into a Corporate Integrity Agreement with the Office of Counsel to the Inspector General of the Department of Health and Human Services which requires it to unwind some of its business arrangements and restructure others, and includes the appointment of an Independent Monitor to prospectively review DaVita’s arrangements with nephrologists and other health care providers for compliance with the Anti-Kickback Statute.

“Companies seeking to boost profits by paying physician kickbacks for patient referrals – as the government contended in this case – undermine impartial medical judgment at the expense of patients and taxpayers,” said Daniel R. Levinson, Inspector General for the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.  “Expect significant settlements and our continued investigation of such wasteful business arrangements.”

The settlement resolves allegations originally brought in a lawsuit filed under the qui tam or whistleblower provisions of the False Claims Act, which allow private parties to bring suit on behalf of the government and to share in any recovery.  The suit was filed by David Barbetta, who was previously employed by DaVita as a Senior Financial Analyst in DaVita’s Mergers and Acquisitions Department. Mr. Barbetta’s share of the recovery has yet to be determined.          

This settlement illustrates the government’s emphasis on combating health care fraud and marks another achievement for the Health Care Fraud Prevention and Enforcement Action Team (HEAT) initiative, which was announced in May 2009 by the Attorney General and the Secretary of Health and Human Services.  The partnership between the two departments has focused efforts to reduce and prevent Medicare and Medicaid financial fraud through enhanced cooperation.  One of the most powerful tools in this effort is the False Claims Act.  Since January 2009, the Justice Department has recovered a total of more than $22.4 billion through False Claims Act cases, with more than $14.2 billion of that amount recovered in cases involving fraud against federal health care programs.

The case was handled by the United States Attorney’s Office for the District of Colorado, the Civil Division of the United States Department of Justice, and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Inspector General.

The lawsuit is captioned United States ex rel. David Barbetta v. DaVita, Inc. et al., No. 09-cv-02175-WJM-KMT (D. Colo.).  The claims settled by this agreement are allegations only; there has been no determination of liability.

FEDERAL BANKING AGENCIES REPORT FINDS DEFICIENCIES IN UNDERWRITING STANDARDS AND RISK MANAGEMENT

FROM:  FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION 

For Immediate Release November 7, 2014 

Credit Risk in the Shared National Credit Portfolio is High; Leveraged Lending Remains a Concern

The credit quality of large loan commitments owned by U.S. banking organizations, foreign banking organizations (FBOs), and nonbanks is generally unchanged in 2014 from the prior year, federal banking agencies said Friday. In a supplemental report, the agencies highlighted findings specific to leveraged lending, including serious deficiencies in underwriting standards and risk management of leveraged loans.

The annual Shared National Credits (SNC) review found that the volume of criticized assets remained elevated at $340.8 billion, or 10.1 percent of total commitments, which approximately is double pre-crisis levels. The stagnation in credit quality follows three consecutive years of improvements. A criticized asset is rated special mention, substandard, doubtful, or loss as defined by the agencies' uniform loan classification standards. The SNC review was completed by the Federal Reserve Board, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and Office of the Comptroller of the Currency.

Leveraged loans as reported by agent banks totaled $767 billion, or 22.6 percent of the 2014 SNC portfolio and accounted for $254.7 billion, or 74.7 percent, of criticized SNC assets. Material weaknesses in the underwriting and risk management of leveraged loans were observed, and 33.2 percent of leveraged loans were criticized by the agencies.

The leveraged loan supplement also identifies several areas where institutions need to strengthen compliance with the March 2013 guidance, including provisions addressing borrower repayment capacity, leverage, underwriting, and enterprise valuation. In addition, examiners noted risk-management weaknesses at several institutions engaged in leveraged lending including lack of adequate support for enterprise valuations and reliance on dated valuations, weaknesses in credit analysis, and overreliance on sponsor's projections.

Federal banking regulations require institutions to employ safe and sound practices when engaging in commercial lending activities, including leveraged lending. As a result of the SNC exam, the agencies will increase the frequency of leveraged lending reviews to ensure the level of risk is identified and managed.

In response to questions, the agencies also are releasing answers to FAQs on the guidance. The questions cover expectations when defining leveraged loans, supervisory expectations on the origination of non-pass leveraged loans, and other topics. The FAQ document is intended to advance industry and examiner understanding of the guidance, and promote consistent application in policy formulation, implementation, and regulatory supervisory assessments.

Other highlights of the 2014 SNC review:

Total SNC commitments increased by $379 billion to $3.39 trillion, or 12.6 percent from the 2013 review. Total SNC outstanding increased $206 billion to $1.57trillion, an increase of 15.2 percent.

Criticized assets increased from $302 billion to $341 billion, representing 10.1 percent of the SNC portfolio, compared with 10.0 percent in 2013. Criticized dollar volume increased 12.9 percent from the 2013 level.

Leveraged loans comprised 72.9 percent of SNC loans rated special mention, 75.3 percent of all substandard loans, 81.6 percent of all doubtful loans, and 83.9 percent of all nonaccrual loans.

Classified assets increased from $187 billion to $191 billion, representing 5.6 percent of the portfolio, compared with 6.2 percent in 2013. Classified dollar volume increased 2.1 percent from 2013.

Credits rated special mention, which exhibit potential weakness and could result in further deterioration if uncorrected, increased from $115 billion to $149 billion, representing 4.4 percent of the portfolio, compared with 3.8 percent in 2013. Special mention dollar volume increased 29.6 percent from the 2013 level.
The overall severity of classifications declined, with credits rated as doubtful decreasing from $14.5 billion to $11.8 billion and assets rated as loss decreasing slightly from $8 billion to $7.8 billion. Loans that were rated either doubtful or loss account for 0.6 percent of the portfolio, compared with 0.7 percent in the prior review. Adjusted for losses, nonaccrual loans declined from $61 billion to $43billion, a 27.8percent reduction.

The distribution of credits across entity types—U.S. bank organizations, FBOs, and nonbanks—remained relatively unchanged. U.S. bank organizations owned 44.1 percent of total SNC loan commitments, FBOs owned 33.5 percent, and nonbanks owned 22.4 percent. Nonbanks continued to own a larger share of classified (73.6 percent) and nonaccrual (76.7 percent) assets than their total share of the SNC portfolio (22.4 percent). Institutions insured by the FDIC owned 10.1percent of classified assets and 6.7 percent of nonaccrual loans.
The SNC program was established in 1977 to provide an efficient and consistent review and analysis of SNCs. A SNC is any loan or formal loan commitment, and asset such as real estate, stocks, notes, bonds, and debentures taken as debts previously contracted, extended to borrowers by a federally supervised institution, its subsidiaries, and affiliates that aggregates $20 million or more and is shared by three or more unaffiliated supervised institutions. Many of these loan commitments also are participated with FBOs and nonbanks, including securitization pools, hedge funds, insurance companies, and pension funds.

In conducting the 2014 SNC Review, the agencies reviewed $975 billion of the $3.39 trillion credit commitments in the portfolio. The sample was weighted toward noninvestment grade and criticized credits. In preparing the leveraged loan supplement, the agencies reviewed $623 billion in commitments or 63.9 percent of leveraged borrowers, representing 81 percent of all leveraged loans by dollar commitments. The results of the review and supplement are based on analyses prepared in the second quarter of 2014 using credit-related data provided by federally supervised institutions as of December 31, 2013, and March 31, 2014.