DIGITAL CURRENCY COMPANY AND SEVEN PRINCIPALS AND EMPLOYEES CHARGED IN MONEY LAUNDERING SCHEME

FROM: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Tuesday, May 28, 2013

One of the World’s Largest Digital Currency Companies and Seven of Its Principals and Employees Charged in Manhattan Federal Court with Running Alleged $6 Billion Money Laundering Scheme

Liberty Reserve Allegedly Processed at Least 55 Million Illegal Transactions for at Least One Million Users Worldwide Facilitating Global Criminal Conduct; Investigation and Takedown Believed to Be the Largest International Money Laundering Prosecution in History, Involving Law Enforcement Actions in 17 Countries

　

Mythili Raman, Acting Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice; Preet Bharara, U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York; Steven G. Hughes, Special Agent-in-Charge of the New York Office of the U.S. Secret Service; Richard Weber, Chief of the Internal Revenue Service, Criminal Investigation (IRS-CI); and James T. Hayes Jr., Special Agent-in-Charge of the New York Field Office of the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), announced today the unsealing of an indictment charging Liberty Reserve, a company that operated one of the world’s most widely used digital currency services, and seven of its principals and employees with money laundering and operating an unlicensed money transmitting business. Liberty Reserve is alleged to have had more than one million users worldwide, including more than 200,000 users in the U.S., who conducted approximately 55 million transactions – virtually all of which were illegal – and laundered more than $6 billion in suspected proceeds of crimes including credit card fraud, identity theft, investment fraud, computer hacking, child pornography and narcotics trafficking.

Five defendants were arrested on May 24, 2013, including Arthur Budovsky, the principal founder of Liberty Reserve, who was arrested in Spain; Vladmir Kats, the co-founder of Liberty Reserve, who was arrested in Brooklyn, New York; Azzeddine El Amine, a manager of Liberty Reserve’s financial accounts, who was arrested in Spain; and Mark Marmilev and Maxim Chukharev, who helped design and maintain Liberty Reserve’s technological infrastructure, who were arrested in Brooklyn and Costa Rica, respectively. Two other defendants, Ahmed Yassine Abdelghani (Yassine) and Allan Esteban Hidalgo Jimenez (Hidalgo), are at large in Costa Rica.

In addition to the criminal charges brought in the indictment, five domain names were seized, namely, the domain name of Liberty Reserve and the domain names of four exchanger websites that were controlled by one or more of the defendants; 45 bank accounts were restrained or seized; and a civil action was filed against 35 exchanger websites seeking the forfeiture of the exchangers’ domain names because the websites were used to facilitate the Liberty Reserve money laundering conspiracy and constitute property involved in money laundering. The four exchangers whose domain names were seized, as well as the 35 exchangers whose domain names are the subjects of the civil forfeiture action, were all exchangers that transacted business with Liberty Reserve and were listed on Liberty Reserve’s website as "pre-approved exchangers." The investigation and takedown involved law enforcement action in 17 countries, including Costa Rica, the Netherlands, Spain, Morocco, Sweden, Switzerland, Cyprus, Australia, China, Norway, Latvia, Luxembourg, the United Kingdom, Russia, Canada and the U.S.

In a coordinated action, the U.S. Department of the Treasury and its Financial Crimes Enforcement Network today announced that Liberty Reserve has been named as a financial institution of primary money laundering concern under Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act. This action includes a notice to the Federal Register proposing to prohibit covered U.S. financial institutions from opening or maintaining correspondent or payable-through accounts for foreign banks that are being used to process transactions involving Liberty Reserve.

Acting Assistant Attorney General Raman said: "As charged, Liberty Reserve operated, on an enormous scale, a digital currency system designed to provide cyber and other criminals with a way to launder their profits without leaving a trace. The company’s very purpose was to launder its users’ criminal proceeds through the U.S. and global financial system. By indicting Liberty Reserve and its principals, restraining over $25 million in criminal proceeds, forfeiting domain names, and seizing servers in countries around the globe, our message is clear: money launderers can run, but they can’t hide from the U.S. justice system. Combating the threat of global illicit finance requires using every tool we have at our disposal, and today we demonstrate our resolve to ensure that criminals who exploit the U.S. and global financial system will be held to account."

U.S. Attorney Bharara said: " As alleged, the only liberty that Liberty Reserve gave many of its users was the freedom to commit crimes – the coin of its realm was anonymity, and it became a popular hub for fraudsters, hackers, and traffickers. The global enforcement action we announce today is an important step towards reining in the ‘Wild West’ of illicit Internet banking. As crime goes increasingly global, the long arm of the law has to get even longer, and in this case, it encircled the earth."

Secret Service Special Agent-in-Charge Hughes said: "These arrests are an example of the Secret Service’s commitment to investigate and apprehend criminals engaged in the misuse of virtual currencies to conduct global monetary fraud. Cyber criminals should be reminded today that they are unable to hide behind the anonymity of the Internet to avoid regulated financial systems. We are grateful to our many law enforcement partners throughout the world for assistance in this investigation, especially in Costa Rica, Spain and the Netherlands."

IRS-CI Chief Weber said: "We are now entering the cyber age of money laundering. Technology advancements over the past several years have dramatically increased opportunities for criminals to move, conceal and enjoy their ill-gotten gains. Liberty Reserve and its principals have been charged with operating a sophisticated and complex system for structuring financial transactions which catered to those engaged in such criminal activity. What they did not anticipate was our robust partnerships with domestic and foreign law enforcement that allowed us collectively to follow the cyber money trail in the United States and around the world."

ICE HSI Special Agent-in-Charge Hayes said: "The actions of the U.S. Secret Service, IRS, and HSI in dismantling the Liberty Reserve operation are critical because transnational criminal organizations can succeed only so long as they can funnel their illicit proceeds freely and without detection. HSI is proud of its partnership through the Global Illicit Financial Team and will continue to aggressively target financial institutions that deliberately enable businesses and individuals to evade global financial systems in furtherance of criminal schemes."

According to the allegations in the indictment, the civil forfeiture complaint, and other documents filed in federal court:

Background

Liberty Reserve was incorporated in Costa Rica in 2006 and operated the digital currency commonly referred to as "LR." While the company billed itself as the Internet’s "largest payment processor and money transfer system," serving "millions" of people around the world, including the U.S., at no time did the company register with the U.S. Department of the Treasury as a money transmitting business, as required by law.

Budovsky, the principal founder of Liberty Reserve, directed and supervised its operations, finances, and corporate strategy. Kats, a co-founder, helped operate the company until 2009. The day-to-day operations of Liberty Reserve were managed, at different times, by Hidalgo and Yassine. El Amine managed various financial accounts controlled by Liberty Reserve, while Marmilev and Chukharev were primarily responsible for designing and maintaining the company’s technological infrastructure.

Overview of Liberty Reserve’s Money Laundering Operation

The defendants created, structured and operated Liberty Reserve as a criminal bank-payment processor designed to help users conduct illegal transactions anonymously and launder the proceeds of their crimes. It emerged as one of the principal money transfer agents used by cyber criminals around the world to distribute, store, and launder the proceeds of their illegal activity. The company grew into a financial hub of the cybercrime world, facilitating a broad range of online criminal activity, including credit card fraud, identity theft, investment fraud, computer hacking, child pornography and narcotics trafficking. Liberty Reserve was used extensively for illegal purposes, functioning as the bank of choice for the criminal underworld because it provided an infrastructure that enabled cyber criminals around the world to conduct anonymous and untraceable financial transactions.

The defendants also protected the criminal infrastructure of Liberty Reserve by, among other things, lying to anti-money laundering authorities in Costa Rica and pretending to shut down Liberty Reserve after learning the company was being investigated by U.S. law enforcement. They then continued operating the business through a set of shell companies, and moved tens of millions of dollars through shell company accounts maintained in Cyprus, Russia, China, Hong Kong, Morocco, Spain, Australia and elsewhere.

The Criminal Design of Liberty Reserve

In order to use LR currency, a user first had to open an account through the Liberty Reserve website and provide basic identifying information. Unlike traditional banks or legitimate online processors, Liberty Reserve did not require users to validate their identities. Users routinely established accounts under false names, including such blatantly criminal names as "Russia Hackers" and "Hacker Account." As part of the investigation, a law enforcement agent opened and executed transactions through an undercover account at Liberty Reserve in the name of "Joe Bogus" and the address "123 Fake Main Street" in "Completely Made Up City, New York."

Once an account was established, the user could conduct transactions with other Liberty Reserve users. In these transactions, the user could receive transfers of LR from other users’ accounts, and transfer LR from his or her own account to other users, including any "merchants" that accepted LR as payment. Liberty Reserve charged a one-percent fee up to a maximum of $2.99, every time a user transferred LR to another user through the Liberty Reserve system. For an additional "privacy fee" of 75 cents per transaction, a user could hide his or her own Liberty Reserve account number when transferring funds, effectively making the transfer completely untraceable, even within Liberty Reserve’s already opaque system.

To add an additional layer of anonymity, Liberty Reserve did not permit users to fund their accounts by transferring money to the company directly through a credit card transfer or other means. Users also could not withdraw funds from their accounts directly. Instead, Liberty Reserve users were required to make any deposits or withdrawals through the use of third-party "exchangers," which enabled the company to avoid collecting any information about its users through banking transactions or other activity that would leave a centralized financial paper trail. Budovsky, Kats and El Amine owned and operated certain Liberty Reserve exchanger services.

The Liberty Reserve website recommended a number of "pre-approved" exchangers, which tended to be unlicensed money transmitting businesses operating in countries without significant governmental money laundering oversight or regulation, such as in Malaysia, Russia, Nigeria, and Vietnam. The exchangers charged transaction fees for their services that were much higher than the fees charged by mainstream banks or payment processors for comparable money transfers.

The Criminal Use of Liberty Reserve

To further enable the use of Liberty Reserve for criminal activity, its website offered a "shopping cart interface" that "merchant" websites could use to accept LR currency as a form of payment. The "merchants" who accepted LR currency were overwhelmingly criminal in nature. They included traffickers of stolen credit card data and personal identity information, peddlers of various types of online Ponzi and get-rich-quick schemes, computer hackers for hire, unregulated gambling enterprises, and underground drug-dealing websites.

In addition to being used to process payments for illegal goods and services online, Liberty Reserve was also used by cyber criminals to launder criminal proceeds and transfer funds among criminal associates. For example, Liberty Reserve was used by credit-card theft and computer-hacking rings operating in countries around the world, including Vietnam, Nigeria, Hong Kong, China, and the U.S., to distribute proceeds of these conspiracies among the members involved.

The defendants were well aware that Liberty Reserve functioned as an unlawful money-laundering enterprise. In an online chat between Kats and Yassine that was captured by law enforcement, Kats explicitly described Liberty Reserve’s activities as "illegal" and noted that "everyone in USA" such as "DOJ" knows "LR is [a] money laundering operation that hackers use."

* * *

Liberty Reserve, Budovsky, 39, a citizen of Costa Rica who resides in the Netherlands, Kats, 41, of Brooklyn, New York, Yassine, 42, of Costa Rica, Hidalgo, 28, of Costa Rica, El Amine, 46, of Costa Rica, Marmilev, 33, of Brooklyn, New York, and Chukharev, 27, of Costa Rica, are each charged with one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering, which carries a maximum term of 20 years in prison, one count of conspiracy to operate an unlicensed money transmitting business, which carries a maximum term of five years in prison, and operation of an unlicensed money transmitting business, which carries a maximum term of five years in prison. The terms of incarceration apply to the individual defendants.

This case was investigated by the Secret Service, the IRS-CI and ICE HSI, which worked together in this case as part of the Global Illicit Financial Team. The Secret Service’s New York Electronic Crimes Task Force assisted with the investigation, as well as the Judicial Investigation Organization in Costa Rica, the National High Tech Crime Unit in the Netherlands, the Spanish National Police, Financial and Economic Crime Unit, the Cyber Crime Unit at the Swedish National Bureau of Investigation, and the Swiss Federal Prosecutor’s Office. The Shadowserver Foundation acted as the hosting provider for the domain names that were seized pursuant to the Court-authorized seizure warrants. The Department of Justice’s Office of International Affairs and Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section also provided support.

This case is being prosecuted jointly with the Department of Justice’s Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section, which is overseen by Acting Assistant Attorney General Mythili Raman; and the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York’s Complex Frauds Unit and Asset Forfeiture Unit.


If you believe you were a victim of a crime and were defrauded of funds through the use of Liberty Reserve, and you wish to provide information to law enforcement and/or receive notice of future developments in the case or additional information, please contact (888) 238-0696 or (212) 637-1583.


The charges contained in the indictment are merely accusations and the defendants are presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty.

FORMER OFFICERS OF OIL/GAS COMPANY CHARGED WITH FRAUD AND MAKING FALSE STATEMENTS

FROM: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Tuesday, May 28, 2013

Former Corporate Officers of China-Based Oil and Gas Company Charged with Fraud and False Statements

WASHINGTON – The former president and CEO, and the former vice president of corporate finance of China North East Petroleum Holdings Limited (CNEP), an oil and gas company whose stock is traded in the United States, have been charged with defrauding investors in connection with public offerings of stock.


Acting Assistant Attorney General Mythili Raman of the Criminal Division; U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia Ronald C. Machen Jr.; Assistant Director in Charge George Venizelos of the FBI’s New York Field Office; and Chief Richard Weber of the Internal Revenue Service’s Criminal Investigation (IRS-CI), made the announcement.


Wang Hongjun, 41, and Chao Jiang, 32, both Chinese citizens residing in California and New York, respectively, were indicted on May 23, 2013, with one count of conspiracy to commit wire and securities fraud and four counts of securities fraud, which each carry a maximum penalty of 25 years in prison. Jiang is also charged with two counts of false statements to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) during sworn testimony, which each carry a maximum penalty of five years in prison. The indictment was made public today.

According to the indictment, Hongjun served as the president and CEO of CNEP from 2009 to 2010, and as the chairman of the Board of Directors beginning in 2010. Jiang served as the vice president of corporate finance and corporate secretary of CNEP from 2008 until approximately 2011. The charges allege that in June of 2009, CNEP registered a shelf offering with the SEC proposing to sell up to $40 million of CNEP common stock in the United States on the New York Stock Exchange. In September and December of 2009, CNEP made two separate offerings pursuant to the June registration. In documents filed with the SEC related to the offerings, and in other public statements to investors, Hongjun and Jiang informed investors that CNEP intended to use the funds raised from the securities offerings for general corporate purposes and to repay a prior corporate debt.

The indictment alleges that, instead of using the offering proceeds as represented to CNEP’s investors, Hongjun and Jiang misappropriated approximately $1,265,000 of the proceeds by wiring the money to bank accounts in the name of their family members – approximately $965,000 to Jiang’s father and approximately $300,000 to Hongjun’s wife – which was used, in part, to purchase a home in California, jewelry and a Mercedes-Benz.

In addition, the indictment alleges that Jiang testified falsely under oath to the SEC in Washington, D.C., about these transactions. In that testimony, Jiang stated that none of his family members had received anything of value over $500 from CNEP, despite having wired $965,000 from CNEP’s bank account to the account of his father. Jiang also testified falsely regarding the use of proceeds from the securities offerings.

An indictment is merely an accusation, and defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty in a court of law.

In a related action, the SEC had previously filed a civil enforcement action against Hongjun, Jiang and others in the Southern District of New York.

The case was investigated by the FBI’s New York Field Office and IRS-CI. The department wishes to thank the SEC for its significant assistance in this case. The investigation is continuing.


This case is being prosecuted by Trial Attorneys Daniel Kahn and Kevin Muhlendorf of the Criminal Division’s Fraud Section and Assistant U.S. Attorney David Johnson for the District of Columbia.

U.S. TREASURY TARGETS BUSINESSES RELATED TO IRAN'S NUCLEAR AND MISSILE PROLIFERATION ACTIVITIES

FROM:  U.S. TREASURYActions Target Iran’s Nuclear and Missile Proliferation Activities 
WASHINGTON – The U.S. Department of the Treasury is taking action today against 20 individuals and entities for their involvement in Iran’s nuclear and missile proliferation networks and Iran’s continued attempts to circumvent sanctions. These networks are responsible for moving supplies and providing essential services to Iran’s clandestine nuclear and weapons programs. These actions are designed to increase pressure on the Iranian regime by tightening sanctions against Iran’s energy sector and exposing key proliferation related networks that span the globe from Europe to Asia.

"As long as Iran continues to pursue a nuclear and ballistic missile program in defiance of multiple UN Security Council Resolutions, the U.S. will target and disrupt those involved in Iran’s illicit activities," said Treasury Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David S. Cohen. "We will continue to work with our international partners to intensify this pressure and tighten sanctions on Iran’s energy sector as it provides much needed financial support for the Iranian regime’s proliferation activity."

Fourteen of the entities and individuals being designated today are part of Iran’s international procurement and proliferation operations. These designations are being made pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13382, which targets weapons of mass destruction proliferators and their supporters. The designations focus on entities and individuals supporting previously designated entities within Iran’s proliferation network as well as Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Naftiran Intertrade Company (NICO), and Iran’s Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL). These organizations are at the center of Iran’s continued proliferation activities. Today’s designations include companies supporting IRGC attempts to clandestinely ship illicit cargo around the world, including to Syria. They also target the Deputy Defense Minister and Dean of Malek Ashtar University, who is responsible for significant contributions to Iran’s missile program, as well as companies and individuals supporting Iran’s nuclear program.

Today Treasury is identifying Seifollah Jashnsaz, Chairman of NICO and director of Hong Kong Intertrade Company and Petro Suisse Intertrade Company SA as well as five individuals holding other leadership positions in Iran’s energy sector who have been involved in Iranian attempts to evade international sanctions. These individuals work for the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), NICO, and previously-identified Iranian front companies. Specifically, they are being identified today as subject to sanctions under E.O. 13599, which, among other things, targets the Government of Iran (GOI) and persons acting for or on behalf of the GOI. In addition to Seifollah Jashnsaz, the following individuals are being identified today: Ahmad Ghalebani, managing director of NIOC and a director of both Petro Suisse Intertrade Company SA and Hong Kong Intertrade Company; Farzad Bazargan, managing director of Hong Kong Intertrade Company; Hashem Pouransari, NICO official and managing director of Asia Energy General Trading LLC; and Mahmoud Nikousokhan, NIOC finance director and a director of Petro Suisse Intertrade Company SA.

In 2008, the Treasury Department identified NIOC and NICO, both centrally involved in the sale of Iranian oil, as entities that are owned or controlled by the GOI. Additionally, NIOC was determined to be an agent or affiliate of the IRGC in November 2012 and NICO was designated under E.O. 13382 in April 2013 for being owned or controlled by NIOC. In order to prevent the circumvention of the international community’s sanctions on oil trade with Iran, the Department of the Treasury later identified, among others, Switzerland-based Petro Suisse Intertrade Company SA, United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.)-based Asia Energy General Trading LLC, and Hong Kong-based Hong Kong Intertrade Company as front companies for NIOC or NICO.

U.S. persons are generally prohibited from engaging in any transactions with the entities and individuals listed today, and any assets of those persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction are frozen. Additionally, today’s designations under E.O. 13382 carry consequences under the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA). Foreign financial institutions that knowingly facilitate significant transactions or provide significant financial services for these sanctioned entities or individuals are exposed to potential loss of access to the U.S. financial system.

Proliferation Designations Related to the IRGC

The IRGC continues to be a primary focus of U.S. and international sanctions against Iran because of the central role it plays in Iran’s ballistic missile and nuclear programs and its involvement in serious human rights abuses. The IRGC was designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 in October 2007 for having engaged in proliferation-related activities.

Iran Air was designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 in June 2011 for providing support and services to Iran’s, IRGC, MODAFL, and Iran’s Air Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO). Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury is designating several individuals and entities that have provided support to Iran Air and are part of an Iran Air aircraft procurement and support network. This network is also related to Mahan Air and the IRGC-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) and has provided the support needed by these airlines to continue their operations. These activities have included ferrying military and crowd control equipment to the Assad regime as it carries out its campaign of violence against the people of Syria. Mahan Air was designated pursuant to E.O. 13224 for providing financial, material and technological support to the IRGC-QF.

Three Iran based companies being designated today have an international footprint – Aban Air, DFS Worldwide and Everex – and are actively assisting Iran Air by providing it with financial services, aviation related procurement and freight forwarding.

Also being designated today are senior officials of the companies - Ali Mahdavi of Aban Air, DFS Worldwide and Everex, Bahareh Mirza Hossein Yazdi of DFS Worldwide and Everex.

Aban Air

Aban Air has offices in Iran, the United Kingdom (U.K.), and the U.A.E. It is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for providing financial, material, and technological support to Iran Air. Aban Air pays the salaries of Iran Air employees and provides them with training. Aban Air has also attempted to acquire aircraft and aircraft parts for Iran Air, carried international freight and cargo for Iran Air, provided Iran Air pilots with non-Iranian pilot licenses and attempted to help Iran Air register its planes outside of Iran.

Additionally, the IRGC used Aban Air to clandestinely ship cargo to and from Iran and Aban Air has held a contract with Mahan Air to carry international freight and cargo for Mahan Air.

Ali Mahdavi

Ali Mahdavi is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for acting for or on behalf of Aban Air. Mahdavi is the chairman and 50% owner of Aban Air and also leads DFS Worldwide and Everex, which were also designated today for their links to Aban Air.

Everex

Everex has offices in Iran, the U.K., and the U.A.E. It is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 because it acts or purports to act for or on behalf of Aban Air. Everex conspired with Iran Air to import aviation parts into Iran in contravention of sanctions by falsifying end-user certificates and airway bills. Everex also worked with Aban Air to ship cargo on Iran Air from Iran to Sudan.

DFS Worldwide

DFS Worldwide has offices in Iran, South Africa, the U.A.E., the U.K., and Germany. It is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for acting for or on behalf of Everex and providing services and support to Iran Air and the IRGC. It was founded as a result of the renaming of Everex with no changes concerning addresses, clients, or personnel. DFS Worldwide is a front company for the shipment of equipment from the U.A.E. to Iran. DFS Worldwide carried international freight for Iran Air and regularly booked cargoes for Iran Air.

In addition, DFS Worldwide also served as an expeditor of air cargo for the IRGC and the IRGC used DFS Worldwide to covertly ship cargo to and from Iran. The IRGC-QF repeatedly used DFS Worldwide to ship goods from Dubai to Tehran. DFS Worldwide carried international freight for Mahan Air. DFS Worldwide served as a general cargo and sales agent for Mahan Air, booking and issuing airway bills for Mahan Air.

Bahareh Mirza Hossein Yazdi

Bahareh Mirza Hossein Yazdi is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of DFS Worldwide and Everex through her position as a director for DFS Worldwide and Everex.

Farhad Parvaresh

Farhad Parvaresh is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for acting for or on behalf of Iran Air by serving as the chairman and managing director of Iran Air.

Designations Related to the IRGC and NIOC

Petro Green
Petro Green, located in Malaysia, is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for providing or attempting to provide goods and services to Khatam Ol-Anbiya (KOA), a construction and engineering firm connected to the IRGC. Since at least 2009, Petro Green has been a primary procurement agent for KOA in its attempt to circumvent U.S. sanctions. KOA was designated by Treasury pursuant to E.O. 13382 on October 25, 2007 for being owned or controlled by the IRGC.

Hossein Vaziri, Energy Global International Fze, and Global Sea Line Company Ltd.
Hossein Vaziri is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, the IRGC. Vaziri was the Managing Director of Petro Green, Energy Global International Fze, located in the U.A.E. and Global Sea Line Company Ltd. which located in Singapore. These two companies were also designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 today for being owned or controlled by, or acting for or on behalf of Vaziri, or providing services and support to KOA. Vaziri utilizes Energy Global International and Global Sea Line to facilitate the movement of hundreds of millions of dollars on behalf of NICO.

Designation related to Iran’s Nuclear Program
Farhad Bujar
Farhad Bujar is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for acting for or on behalf of the Iranian Centrifuge Technology Company (TESA). TESA was designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 on November 21, 2011 and plays a crucial role in Iran’s uranium enrichment nuclear program. TESA is in charge of the production of the IR-1centrifuge, the type of centrifuge Iran has used to enrich uranium.

Farhad Bujar is the Managing Director of TESA. Through his role as Managing Director of TESA, Bujar is in charge of reviewing TESA’s budget figures, including TESA’s goals for optimizing first- and second generation centrifuge production lines and production of 3,000 advanced IR-2M centrifuges.

Zolal Iran Company

Zolal Iran Company is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for providing services or support to Iran’s Modern Industries Technique Company (MITEC). MITEC was designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 on November 21, 2011 by Treasury for being owned or controlled by and providing services to the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI).

Zolal Iran Company specializes on a project at Iran’s IR-40 heavy water research reactor. Zolal Iran Company is compensated by MITEC for its work on the purification packages for Iran’s IR-40 heavy water research reactor.

Andisheh Zolal Co.

Andisheh Zolal is beingdesignated pursuant to E.O. 13382 because it is owned or controlled by Zolal Iran Company. Andishel Zolal is a sister company of Zolal Iran Company and is co-located with Zolal Iran Company.

Designation related to Iran’s Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL)

Reza Mozaffarinia

Reza Mozaffarinia is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for acting for or on behalf of MODAFL. Mozaffarinia is MODAFL’s Deputy Defense Minister and Dean of Malek Ashtar University (MUT). He is responsible for significant contributions to Iran’s missile program. Mozaffarinia has been the head of MUT since at least 2009. MUT was designated on July 12, 2012 pursuant to E.O. 13382 for being owned or controlled by MODAFL. MUT was identified in the Annex to UNSCR 1929 because it is a subordinate of the Defense Technology and Science Research Center within MODAFL.

During an interview by a network correspondent regarding the first satellite Iran successfully launched into space, the Omid satellite, Mozaffarinia stated that during the next ten years, a number of other satellites would be launched as a result of the National Aerospace Organization’s research and development efforts. In addition, Mozaffarinia claims MUT has introduced some special graduate courses which focus on research in order to train students to develop special technology targets.

COMPANY RESOLVES ALLEGED CLEAN AIR ACT VIOLATIONS WITH EPA AND LDEQ.

FROM: U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
United States Takes Action to Reduce Hazards from Phosphoric Acid Manufacturing at Louisiana Facility

WASHINGTON –The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality (LDEQ) announced that PCS Nitrogen has agreed to reduce air emissions from phosphoric acid production at its facility in Geismar, La.

"Reducing pollution from mining and mineral processing operations is one of EPA’s national enforcement initiatives because these facilities release more toxic chemicals than any other sector," said Cynthia Giles, assistant administrator for EPA’s Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance. "This settlement will reduce millions of pounds of hazardous air pollutants, ensuring that the residents of Geismar Louisiana have cleaner air."

The settlement resolves PCS’s alleged Clean Air Act violations at its cooling tower operations, which use scrubbers to control air emissions from its phosphoric acid processing equipment. Under the settlement, PCS will prevent the release of 15 million pounds of hydrogen fluoride, a hazardous air pollutant annually and will pay a civil penalty of $198,825.30. PCS has already implemented the pollution controls sought in the settlement.

Mining and mineral processing facilities generate more toxic and hazardous waste than any other industrial sector, based on EPA’s Toxic Release Inventory. In a national enforcement effort, EPA has focused on the phosphoric acid industry because of the high risk of groundwater contamination from facility wastewaters to nearby areas, and the release of acidic wastewaters to local rivers and lakes that cause fish kills. Examples include a 65 million gallon release of acidic wastewaters from the Mosaic Riverview facility into Tampa Bay, which led to a massive local fish kill and a 2007 incident at the Agrifos phosphoric acid facility in Houston that released 50 million gallons of acidic wastewaters into the Houston Ship Channel. Since 2003, EPA has investigated a total of twenty phosphoric acid facilities in seven states.

The consent decree is subject to a 30 day public comment period.

ISTA PHARMACEUTICALS INC., WILL PAY $33.5 MILLION TO SETTLE FALSE CLAIM ACT VIOLATIONS

FROM: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Friday, May 24, 2013
ISTA Pharmaceuticals Inc. Pleads Guilty to Federal Felony Charges; Will Pay $33.5 Million to Resolve Criminal Liability and False Claims Act Allegations

Pharmaceutical company ISTA Pharmaceuticals, Inc. pled guilty earlier today to conspiracy to introduce a misbranded drug into interstate commerce and conspiracy to pay illegal remuneration in violation of the Federal Anti-Kickback Statute, the Justice Department announced today. U.S. District Court Judge Richard J. Arcara accepted ISTA's guilty pleas. The guilty pleas are part of a global settlement with the United States in which ISTA agreed to pay $33.5 million to resolve criminal and civil liability arising from its marketing, distribution and sale of its drug Xibrom.

ISTA pled guilty in the Western District of New York to criminal charges that the company conspired to illegally introduce a misbranded drug, Xibrom, into interstate commerce. Under the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), it is illegal for a drug company to introduce into interstate commerce any drug that the company intends will be used for uses not approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Xibrom is an ophthalmic, nonsteroidal, anti-inflammatory drug that was approved by FDA to treat pain and inflammation following cataract surgery. In order to expand sales of Xibrom outside of its approved use, ISTA conspired to introduce misbranded Xibrom into interstate commerce.

Between 2005 and 2010, some ISTA employees promoted Xibrom for unapproved new uses, including the use of Xibrom following Lasik and glaucoma surgeries, and for the treatment and prevention of cystoid macular edema. The evidence showed that continuing medical education programs were used to promote Xibrom for uses that were not approved by the FDA as safe and effective, and that post-operative instruction sheets for unapproved uses were paid for by some company employees and provided to physicians. These activities are evidence of intended uses unapproved by FDA, which rendered the drug misbranded under the FDCA.

ISTA pled guilty to a felony based on evidence that some ISTA employees were told by management not to memorialize in writing certain interactions with physicians regarding unapproved new uses, and not to leave certain printed materials in physicians' offices relating to unapproved new uses. These instructions were given in order to avoid having their conduct relating to unapproved new uses being detected by others. ISTA agreed that this conduct represented an intent to defraud under the law.

In addition, ISTA pled guilty to a conspiracy to knowingly and willfully offering or paying remuneration to physicians in order to induce those physicians to prescribe Xibrom, in violation of the federal Anti-Kickback Statute. Under the law, it is illegal to offer or pay remuneration, directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash or in kind, to physicians to induce them to refer individuals to pharmacies for the dispensing of drugs, for which payments are made in whole or in part under a Federal health care program. In this matter, certain ISTA employees, with the knowledge and at the direction of ISTA, offered and provided physicians with free Vitrase, another ISTA product, with the intent to induce such physicians to refer individuals to pharmacies for the dispensing of the drug Xibrom. In addition, ISTA provided other illegal remuneration, including a monetary payment to sponsor an event of a non-profit group associated with a particular physician, a golf outing, a wine-tasting event, paid consulting or speaker arrangements, and honoraria for participation in advisory meetings which were intended to be marketing opportunities, with the intent to induce physicians to refer individuals to pharmacies for the dispensing of the drug Xibrom.

Under the terms of the plea agreement, ISTA will pay a total of $18.5 million, including a criminal fine of $16,125,000 for the conspiracy to introduce misbranded Xibrom into interstate commerce, $500,000 for the conspiracy to violate the Anti-Kickback Statute, and $1,850,000 in asset forfeiture associated with the misbranding charge.

ISTA also entered into a civil settlement agreement under which it agreed to pay $15 million to the federal government and states to resolve claims arising from its marketing of Xibrom, which caused false claims to be submitted to government health care programs. The civil settlement resolved allegations that ISTA promoted the sale and use of Xibrom for certain uses that were not FDA-approved and not covered by the Federal health care programs, including prevention and treatment of cystoid macular edema, treatment of pain and inflammation associated with non-cataract eye surgery, and treatment of glaucoma. The United States further alleged that ISTA's violations of the Anti-Kickback Statute resulted in false claims being submitted to federal health care programs. The federal share of the civil settlement is $14,609,746.16, and the state Medicaid share of the civil settlement is $390,253.84. Except as admitted in the plea agreement, the claims settled by the civil settlement agreement are allegations only, and there has been no determination of liability as to those claims.

"As today's global resolution demonstrates, the Department of Justice is committed to making sure that pharmaceutical companies play by the rules," said Stuart F. Delery, Acting Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Division. "Health care fraud in any form undermines the integrity of our health care system and can drive up costs for all of us."

"Today's resolution sends a clear message that pharmaceutical companies cannot put profit ahead of people, by disregarding laws designed to protect the health of the American public," said United States Attorney William J. Hochul, Jr. "The fact that ISTA offered doctors illegal inducements - such as a wine tasting, golf outing, and payments to attend what were in essence marketing sessions - makes the company's illegal conduct particularly deserving of the hefty penalty ISTA has agreed to pay."

"It is especially concerning when companies actively take steps to conceal improper conduct which may jeopardize public health," said Antoinette V. Henry, Special Agent in Charge, Metro-Washington Field Office, FDA Office of Criminal Investigations. "We will continue to work tirelessly with the Department of Justice and our law enforcement counterparts to uncover such conduct."

In addition to the criminal fines and asset forfeiture, ISTA's parent company, Bausch+Lomb, Incorporated (B+L), has agreed to maintain a Compliance and Ethics Program. B+L has agreed that it will maintain policies and procedures that: (1) prohibit the involvement of sales and marketing personnel and others on the businesses' commercial team in the final decision-making process with respect to educational grants in the United States, while also ensuring that the educational programming is focused on objective scientific and educational activities and discourse; (2) require sales agents to discuss only those product uses that are consistent with what is indicated on the product's approved package labeling and to forward requests for information regarding uses of B+L's products not approved by FDA to a Medical Affairs Professional; and (3) prohibit the company from engaging in any conduct that violates the Anti-Kickback Statute, including the offering or paying of any remuneration to any person to induce such person to prescribe any drug for which payment may be made in whole or in part under a Federal health care program. The Program also requires that B+L's President of Global Pharmaceuticals conduct an annual review of the effectiveness of B+L's Program as it relates to the marketing, promotion, and sale of prescription pharmaceutical products, and certify that to the best of his or her knowledge, the Program was effective in preventing violations of Federal health care program requirements and the FDCA regarding sales, marketing, and promotion of B+L's prescription pharmaceutical products.

The civil settlement resolves two lawsuits filed under the whistleblower provisions of the False Claims Act, which permit private parties to file suit on behalf of the United States for false claims and obtain a portion of the government's recovery. The civil lawsuits were filed in the Western District of New York and are captioned United States ex rel. Keith Schenker v. ISTA Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and United States, et al., ex rel. DJ PARTNERSHIP 2011, LLP v. ISTA Pharmaceuticals, Inc. As part of today's resolution, Mr. Schenker will receive approximately $2.5 million from the federal share of the civil recovery.

Upon conviction for the criminal charges described above, ISTA will face mandatory exclusion from Federal healthcare programs. Exclusion will mean that on the effective date of the exclusion, any ISTA labeled drugs in ISTA's possession would no longer be reimbursable by Medicare, Medicaid, or other Federal healthcare programs. In June 2012, B+L acquired ISTA. Simultaneous with the False Claims Act settlement and the entry of the plea, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services' Office of Inspector General, ISTA, and B+L will enter into a Divestiture Agreement under which ISTA agrees to be excluded for 15 years, effective six months after the date of the settlement. Under the terms of the Divestiture Agreement, ISTA will transfer all assets to B+L or a B+L subsidiary and will stop shipping ISTA labeled drugs within six months of the Divestiture Agreement. Six months after the effective date of the Divestiture Agreement, all ISTA labeled drugs in the possession of ISTA or B+L will no longer be reimbursable by Medicare, Medicaid, and other Federal healthcare programs. Those ISTA labeled drugs in the stream of commerce at that time will continue to be reimbursable.

"We agreed to enter into this Divestiture Agreement based on the facts of this case, including that B+L did not have a corporate relationship with ISTA during the improper conduct," said Daniel R. Levinson, Inspector General of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. "In addition, B+L acquired ISTA more than a year after the improper conduct ended, and B+L did not hire any of ISTA's executives or senior management."

The criminal case was prosecuted by Assistant Director Jeffrey Steger of the Consumer Protection Branch of the Civil Division of the Department of Justice and Assistant United States Attorney MaryEllen Kresse of the Office of the U.S. Attorney for the Western District of New York. They were assisted by Associate Chief Counsel Kelsey Schaefer of the Food and Drug Division, Office of General Counsel, Department of Health and Human Services. The case was investigated by the Food and Drug Administration's Office of Criminal Investigations and Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General. The civil settlement was handled by Trial Attorneys Colin Huntley and Benjamin Young of the Commercial Litigation Branch of the Civil Division of the Department of Justice and Assistant United States Attorney Kathleen Lynch of the Office of the U.S. Attorney for the Western District of New York.

This resolution is part of the government's emphasis on combating health care fraud and another step for the Health Care Fraud Prevention and Enforcement Action Team (HEAT) initiative, which was announced by Attorney General Eric Holder and Kathleen Sebelius, Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services in May 2009. The partnership between the two departments has focused efforts to reduce and prevent Medicare and Medicaid financial fraud through enhanced cooperation. One of the most powerful tools in that effort is the False Claims Act, which the Justice Department has used to recover more than $10.4 billion since January 2009 in cases involving fraud against federal health care programs. The Justice Department's total recoveries in False Claims Act cases since January 2009 are over $14.3 billion.

SEC CHARGES PROXY ADVISER FOR NOT SAFEGUARDING CONFIDENTIAL PROXY VOTING INFORMATION

FROM: U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

Washington, D.C., May 23, 2013 — The Securities and Exchange Commission charged a Rockville, Md.-based proxy adviser for failing to safeguard the confidential proxy voting information of clients participating in a number of significant proxy contests.

An SEC investigation found that an employee at Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) provided a proxy solicitor with material, nonpublic information revealing how more than 100 ISS institutional shareholder advisory clients were voting their proxy ballots. In exchange for voting information, the proxy solicitor provided the ISS employee with meals, expensive tickets to concerts and sporting events, and an airline ticket. The breach was made possible in part because ISS lacked sufficient controls over employee access to confidential client vote information, as this employee gathered the data by logging into the ISS voting website from home or work and using his personal e-mail account to communicate details to the proxy solicitor. The employee no longer works at ISS.

ISS, which is registered with the SEC as an investment adviser, agreed to settle the charges by paying $300,000 and retaining an independent compliance consultant.

"Proxy advisers must tailor their controls based on the risks of their particular business in order to protect the integrity of the proxy voting process," said Julie M. Riewe, Deputy Chief of the SEC Enforcement Division's Asset Management Unit. "The internal controls at ISS did not adequately address the potential misuse of confidential proxy voting information by firm employees."

According to the SEC's order instituting settled administrative proceedings, the breach occurred from approximately 2007 to 2012. ISS failed to establish or enforce written policies and procedures reasonably designed to prevent the misuse of material, nonpublic information by ISS employees. Specifically, ISS lacked sufficient controls over employee access to databases of confidential client vote information.

The SEC's order finds that ISS willfully violated Section 204A of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. The order censures the firm and requires ISS to pay a $300,000 penalty and engage an independent compliance consultant to review its supervisory and compliance policies and procedures. The consultant will evaluate whether ISS's procedures are reasonably designed to ensure that its proxy voting services business complies with the Advisers Act in its treatment of confidential information, communications with proxy solicitors, and gifts and entertainment. Without admitting or denying the SEC's findings, ISS agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing any future violations of Section 204A.

The SEC's investigation was conducted in the Boston Regional Office by Robert Baker and Kevin Kelcourse of the Asset Management Unit along with Britt Collins and Rachel Hershfang. They were assisted by members of the Boston Regional Office's examination staff, including Daniel Wong, Paul Prata, and Dan Mazzaferro.